Australia | John Howard - The Shield of Achilles, Phillip Bobbitt

SOURCE http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20040821-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech921.html Speeches 18 June 2004 TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER THE HON JOHN HOWARD MP ADDRESS TO THE AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WESTIN HOTEL, SYDNEY E&OE… It’s less than four years since the Government decided to establish the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). [est. 2001 - here] With a certain youthful precocity, ASPI has injected new ideas and vigour into our national security debate. I congratulate the Institute’s Board and its outgoing Director Hugh White on their considerable achievements. The Australian Government gave ASPI a clear mandate – to provide policy relevant research so as to better inform government decisions and public understanding of strategic and defence issues. We felt that policy discussion in Australia on these matters was too thin and narrow. We wanted a source of high quality, well balanced and carefully argued views from outside the government, believing that greater contestability of advice would contribute over time to improved debate and clearer public policy choices. It’s not often that a government creates an independent policy research body. It’s the sort of action Sir Humphrey Appleby might have described as bordering on ‘courageous’.  [TV character - Yes Minister - here] In its own modest way, it was an act of faith. A faith that says: free and open societies are strong precisely because issues are debated widely and forcefully. Indeed one of the curiosities of 2004 has been the unwillingness of my political opponent to engage in detail expositions of his views and the alternatives he proposes to the Australian people. Such debate is nowhere more important than in the area of national security policy.  [Mark Latham, ALP - link below] A PIVOTAL TIME September 11 recast our thinking about security threats in the twenty-first century. Traditional concerns such as regional flashpoints and rogue states remain, but major power relations appear more benign. Meanwhile, the twin dangers of terrorism and weapons proliferation have come into much sharper focus. There is also much greater attention to transnational threats that flow less from state strength than from state weakness. We are at a pivotal time in world affairs when to fall back on paradigms from the past underestimates the critical dangers we confront. In his acclaimed book, The Shield of Achilles, Phillip Bobbitt argues cogently that we are: ‘at a moment of world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state: only states could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the survival of other states.’ This is no longer true, Bobbitt says, owing to advances in telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. He goes on to claim that: ‘The change in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as anything that the state has thus far undergone.’ Joseph Nye - an acknowledged critic of US action in Iraq - has made a similar point about the deep trends in world politics illuminated by September 11. He describes the 'privatisation of war' as not only a major historical change, but one which could drastically alter civilisation itself. I cite these two respected thinkers for a simple reason. To demonstrate that the perils we face today do not spring from the imaginations of George W. Bush, Tony Blair or John Howard. Nor are they the invention of some neo-conservative group in Washington. This is the uncertain world we live in. A world of grave threats and, it must be said, terrible dilemmas for peace-loving nations. A world that demands strategic focus, steadiness of purpose, clear thinking and flexibility in the use of Australia’s instruments of national strategy. It is a world where governments must integrate foreign and domestic policies as never before. One that demands unprecedented cooperation across defence, foreign affairs, domestic security and intelligence policies. The blurring of old boundaries compels us to see with new clarity the links between terrorism, weapons proliferation and other transnational criminal activity such as trafficking in drugs and people, and money laundering. This is especially so in our neighbourhood, where instability, poor governance and rapid change have added to an environment of strategic uncertainty. For the foreseeable future, the major threats to Australia are more likely to come from terrorists and international criminals than from conventional military attack. In the war against terror, we face an enemy that is elusive; that has global reach; that is bound by neither rules nor morals. Progress has been made degrading terrorist networks since September 11, but the attacks this year in Madrid and elsewhere remind us of the potent threat they pose. Conventional explosives and civilian technologies are bad enough. But the potential for terrorists to gain access to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons makes for truly horrendous prospects. It is the Government’s firm judgement, stated repeatedly, that the threat posed by Islamic extremists cannot be assuaged. Their ideologies of hatred disdain the politics of accommodation and compromise. If they see a wavering or retreating enemy, their response is to hit as hard as they can, and claim responsibility. As the callous attacks in Bali showed, they are devoid of any sentiment of shared humanity. These terrorists must be defeated. The terrorist threat for a country like ours is real. Ironically, the reality of this threat comes from features of modern society that are otherwise positive and welcome. Australia is, for instance, uniquely placed to reap the rewards of globalisation with strong and stable political institutions, a competitive economy and a diverse society. But the very things that work in our favour – our freedom, our openness, our liberal democratic beliefs – leave Australians exposed to globalisation’s dark and potentially destructive edge. The same forces that create opportunities for wealth creation and progress – the international flow of goods, money, people and ideas – also sustain potentially lethal security threats. We know Australia is a terrorist target. It has been since before September 11. Al Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah and other terrorist organisations threaten Australia and Australian interests. And while our region is home to a predominantly moderate and tolerant form of Islam, the Bali bombings showed that we are a target because of who we are and what we stand for. Sadly, this is unlikely to change. And sadly too, geography does not equal immunity. No country is free from risk. Recent times have seen terrorist attacks in Spain, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey and of course Iraq. And the largest group of victims has been Muslims. If globalisation means anything, it means that Australia must respond to what are global security challenges. We must be actively engaged at this pivotal time in confronting the new and terrible threats of the twenty-first century. We cannot wind back the clock or avert our gaze and hope the problems go away. AN INTEGRATED, FLEXIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ASPI’s 2004 strategic review released last month stated correctly that Australia faces its most challenging and turbulent security outlook since the mid-1960s. The Government is acting to meet this challenge with additional resources, strategic flexibility and unwavering resolve. Our integrated national security strategy combines strengthened defence and counter-terrorism capabilities, upgraded infrastructure and transport security, tightened border protection and enhanced international cooperation. Even before 11 September 2001, the Government identified the need to build a more flexible, interoperable and combat-ready defence force. The rebalancing of the ADF that began with 2000 Defence White Paper will not fundamentally alter its size or structure but it will improve its capability by enhancing its fire-power, readiness and mobility. The Defence Capability Review completed last November identified some additional requirements to take account of unconventional threats and new regional responsibilities. Additional investments have been made to strengthen the effectiveness and sustainability of the Army; to improve air defence protection to deploying forces; to enhance the lift capability for deployment; and to position the ADF to exploit current and emerging network-centric warfare advantages. Australia’s counter-terrorism response has been swift, comprehensive and decisive. Additional funding of over $3 billion has been committed since 2001 to ensure our arrangements are as robust as possible. The Government’s three-pronged approach is based on better laws, stronger terrorism-fighting agencies and enhanced international cooperation. The Government’s new framework of counter-terrorism laws preserves precious liberties while recognising that human security is the foundation of what it means to be free. We have enhanced the capacity of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and terrorist organisations. Timely and efficient intelligence gathering is our primary weapon against the potential terrorist threat to Australia. Our intelligence agencies are better resourced now than at any time since the Cold War. ASIO’s budget alone has doubled since September 2001, with expanded capabilities in investigations and analysis, border control, threat assessment, critical infrastructure protection and security assessment. And last month I announced additional funding of over $100 million for the other key intelligence agencies – ASIS, DIO and ONA. Our new strategic environment requires unprecedented coordination of domestic agencies and functions not traditionally associated with national security. The political focal point of decision-making is the National Security Committee of Cabinet which I chair. But the heightened terrorist threat has demanded enhanced policy and operational coordination across government. The Government is also working closely with other levels of government and the private sector on a national approach to transport security and the protection of critical infrastructure. Next week, the Attorney-General will host an important business-government ministerial forum as part of an evolving framework for high level coordination. Strong border protection remains an essential component of an integrated national security strategy. To protect the integrity of Australia’s borders, the capacity of our border control agencies to monitor the movement of people and goods across Australia’s borders has been significantly increased. The final arm of national security is increased international engagement, especially in our region. Clearly, no country can alone secure its interests. Cooperation with other countries is essential. High quality diplomatic representation is therefore an essential component of our national security structure. Australia needs to use all available means to promote global and regional security. We use the multilateral system to advance our national interests in key security areas. But while Australia works with and through the United Nations where this is effective, we will not confine our interaction with particular institutional forms or processes as ends in themselves. The only real test is whether Australian interests and values are being well and truly served. In my view, the debate last year over action in Iraq highlighted a common mistake of seeing attitudes to the United Nations too much in terms of black or white. Australia is a constructive member of the UN, we have always contributed to UN agencies and in broad terms we see the UN as a force for good in the world. When properly supported by member states, the UN can work very effectively on international problems. We saw this in East Timor. But we also know there are times – as shown by such cases as the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Kosovo – when the UN has failed to muster sufficient unanimity of opinion to take necessary action. The fact is that on some occasions the multilateral approach will work and the mechanism to make it work should be nurtured and supported. But equally on other occasions that mechanism is ineffective and coalitions of like-minded countries will be required to act. Our regional security response offers a good example of the Government’s flexibility in its instruments of national strategy. There are few more important tools at the present time than the network of nine bilateral counter-terrorism arrangements Australia has put in place with regional neighbours. These underpin practical, operational-level cooperation between police, intelligence agencies, security authorities, customs and immigration services, defence forces, central banks and financial units. We are working especially closely with Indonesia on strengthening its law enforcement capacity and upgrading its security infrastructure. The case of Australia’s intervention in the Solomon Islands is another example of our strategic flexibility. The crisis of a failing state on our doorstep demanded action. This was clearly legal, being based on a formal request from the Solomon Islands government and endorsed by the relevant regional grouping. But given that government’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, there was virtually no prospect of a UN Security Council Resolution authorising the operation. In the end, the outcome – not the process – was what mattered. We responded effectively to a genuine threat to regional peace and security. An uncertain and messy world will not tailor itself to phoney debates about whether multilateral, regional or bilateral policy instruments are inherently superior. Advancing the security and welfare of the Australian people requires a preparedness to pursue strategies on all fronts when our interests are at stake. IRAQ Tonight I don’t intend to revisit in detail the events surrounding our decision to joint the Coalition that ousted Saddam Hussein from power last year. But I would remind those who now want to rewrite history that disagreement over the war centred on how the international community should respond to Iraq’s continued non-compliance with UN resolutions and defiance of the UN's authority, not whether the regime had weapons of mass destruction. There was in fact a shared assessment by political parties on both sides of the debate that Iraq still maintained WMD programmes. In an Australian context, I would simply draw your attention to a speech in October 2002 by Labor's foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd where he said this: 'Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. That is a matter of empirical fact. If you don't believe the intelligence assessments, you simply read the most recent bulletin from the Federation of American Scientists, which lists Iraq among a number of states in possession of chemical, [and] biological weapons and with the capacity to develop a nuclear program.' I remain convinced that getting rid of Saddam’s odious regime was the right thing to do – right for the world’s long-term security, right for Australia’s national interest and right for the future of the Iraqi people, who deserve an opportunity for a life lived in hope under a democratic, lawful regime, rather than a life of hopelessness under a brutal tyranny. Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair put it well recently when he said that ‘September 11 did not create the threat Saddam posed. But it altered crucially the balance of risk as to whether to deal with it or simply to carry on, however imperfectly, trying to contain it.’ In reality, the crumbling sanctions regime put in place after the first Gulf War meant that the status quo was becoming less and less viable with each passing day. There is no doubt in my mind that Australia’s involvement in the Iraq conflict was consistent with our interests and our values. But whatever your view on the war – and I understand there are differing views in this room – winning the peace in Iraq is now vital. Today, the challenge is to support the Iraqi people themselves through their new, sovereign government after 30 June, in their efforts to build a stable, secure, democratic Iraq – a country at peace with itself and with its neighbours. It is a noble cause – one in which Australia has both a strategic interest and a moral obligation. And we remain in Iraq to do our work on the basis that it is what the Iraqi authorities want us to do. It is imperative that we deny the forces of lawlessness and terror a critical victory they are looking for. The international community needs to show that it is not prepared to indulge their apocalyptic dreams of jihad. To give up on Iraq would be to create a haven for extremists; a sanctuary from which they can spread their ideology of totalitarianism and terror. This alone makes it vital that Australian forces remain in Iraq until their task is completed. In this tough work, our military forces deserve our admiration for their discipline, practical focus and patience. A REPLY TO SOME CRITICS There is a view that says Iraq is none of our business – a view which wants to pull up stumps at this critical hour, with all the implications that would entail. As you know, my political opponent has pledged to withdraw Australia’s contingent in Iraq (however he precisely defines that) by Christmas – to bring them back for the ‘Defence of Australia’. It is a policy that fails the test of Australia’s national interest and international responsibilities. It sends the worst possible signal, to the worst possible people, at the worst possible time. It would undermine our relations with friends and allies. And it seeks to appeal to a strain of isolationist sentiment that diminishes us as a nation. While sensitive to our own neighbourhood, Australia has never adopted an insular or exclusively regional view of our place in the world. We must not start down that road now. Australia has never been passive or indifferent through the great political and ideological struggles that have shaped of our modern world. We weren’t during the First World War. We weren’t during the Second World War. We weren’t during the Cold War. We are not now, as we face new enemies of peace, freedom and democracy. In this light, I find aspects of the Labor Party’s current posture curious to say the least. A posture that acknowledges the threat from terrorists and tyrants, but reserves its most pointed attacks for our great democratic ally, itself the target of history’s most evil terrorist act. A posture that invokes the international community and the United Nations, but decries action to rid the world of a murderous dictator who defied 17 UN Security Council resolutions over 12 years. A posture that moralises in the name of liberal internationalism, but is profoundly uncomfortable with the legitimate use of military power and which sneers at commitments beyond our shores as contrary to Australia’s security interests. The Labor Party tells us that its foreign policy is based on three pillars – the US alliance, the United Nations and engagement with Asia. But what does this mean in the case of Iraq – the defining foreign policy issue of the day? At the very least, the United States would see a unilateral withdrawal by one of the original coalition partners as an unfriendly act. The UN after the unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1546 is now intimately involved in supporting a democratic future for Iraq. The resolution specifically requests member states to contribute military forces to Iraq. Many of our friends in Asia (Japan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) have forces in Iraq helping to stabilise the country. They obviously have no interest in seeing the coalition fail. And does anyone doubt for a moment that a failure of will in Iraq would give enormous comfort to Jemaah Islamiyah with all its reach in our own region? Where we stand today, Iraq is not a diversion from the war on terror. It is the front-line. We must face this reality. International terrorism has invested an enormous amount in breaking the will of the coalition. And each and every turn of the Iraq struggle is interpreted by the terrorists as part of their campaign against the West and moderate Islam. Implicit in the Labor Party’s stance is that if it’s all right for Australia to pull out, then it’s all right for the Americans and the British to go. If that were to happen we would deliver an enormous victory to the terrorists and damn the Iraqi people to a future of mayhem and chaos. This from a party which professes to believe in ‘liberal internationalism’. The Government also faces criticism from a different quarter. To some exponents of realpolitik, all this talk about new threats in the twenty-first century is much exaggerated. To this way of thinking, not that much changed on September 11. We still live in a world where states and geography are trumps. Where Iraq is seen - if I can echo a phrase of long ago - as a faraway country of which we know little. I respect the fact that people differ on what are tough strategic judgements. I strongly believe, however, that a geographically cramped, value-free style of realism is dangerously complacent and contrary to Australia’s interests at this critical hour. The terrorists – including those who have flooded into Iraq – do not respect neat paradigms or state boundaries. As we found to our horror on 12 October 2002 in Bali they target civilians in ways that are difficult to counter through conventional security doctrines. Australia cannot purchase security by keeping its head down and leaving others to do all the heavy lifting. THE US ALLIANCE Where these various criticisms come together is in urging that Australia distance itself from the United States. Such a course offers neither enhanced security nor some false dividend of alleged independence. This Government has worked to strengthen our alliance relationship with the United States – a relationship founded on shared values, common interests and mutual benefits. I believe in the US alliance because it is in our national interest and delivers enormous benefits to Australia. Australia’s ability to influence and work with the United States is vital to meeting the security challenges that we face today – above all terrorism and weapons proliferation. No other country approaches the global power and influence of the United States. This will not change any time soon. Indeed, the United States is likely to become more important to Australia’s future, not less. Our alliance relationship ensures that Australia has privileged access to an unrivalled set of military and intelligence assets. Defence technology and procurement cooperation under the alliance is essential to maintaining the qualitative edge of Australia’s defence forces. Along with our vital intelligence links, this is important not just to counter conventional military threats, but also to disrupt and destroy terrorist networks. Of course, the alliance is a two-way street. The United States should not be expected to carry all the burden and to act alone. Australia cannot proclaim itself an equal partner while looking to cherry-pick the alliance for its own narrow purposes. In this context, I have made no secret of the fact that the alliance relationship was a factor in the Government’s decision to join the US-led campaign in Iraq. A debate over whether or not the American Government will deal with a future Australian Government – whatever its political complexion – misses the point entirely. Of course it will. But given the significance of Iraq to US national security at the present time, any decision by a coalition partner to withdraw troops before the job is completed will not surprisingly be seen as a less than friendly act. What Mr Latham clearly misses is that September 11 led to a fundamental shift in US calculus about the risks it is prepared to accept to its national security. It is important that Australians understand that this new era of American assertiveness is likely to endure whoever occupies the White House. Of course, we can never claim to be a military equal. The United States spends some 43% of global military spending, while Australia’s share is less than 1%. But increasing outlays on defence by this Government mean that we have more options at our disposal and greater capacity to contribute in a meaningful way to alliance coalitions. Inevitably we will have differing priorities at times, but we are able to communicate them in a way that keeps sight of our common objectives. A capacity to speak openly and frankly with the United States at the highest levels is an asset no Australian leader should put at risk by intemperate, personal abuse. Unfortunately, I believe the current leader of the Opposition has embarked on a course that would damage our alliance relationship. I understand this is a serious charge, but I simply take Mr Latham’s statements at face value. The speeches where he attacks the Bush Administration, but offers no recognition of the great and noble purposes that have animated US foreign policy down the ages. The narrowly-defined defence doctrine that would circle the wagons and deny Australia a capability to cooperate with allies beyond our shores. The tired and deeply-flawed view that implies some inconsistency between a close alliance relationship and good relations in Asia. I notice that Mr Latham's most recent recruit, Peter Garrett, had this to say last week, as commentators were reflecting on President Reagan’s legacy: ‘…I have always had a fundamental objection to the way American power has been projected in the past, particularly through Reagan. And I obviously have those objections about the current administration as well ...’. Now here we have a recent and clear statement from Mr Latham’s hand picked protégé about how power works in the international system. If this view had been followed, Reagan’s great achievements - the end of the Soviet empire, and the end of the decades long threat of mutual nuclear destruction - would never have come about. Hundreds of millions of citizens in East Europe, now living in freedom, would still labour under brutal dictatorship. When President Reagan challenged Mikhail Gorbachev to ‘tear down this wall’, he was referring not just to the physical barrier horribly snaking its way from the Wannsee to Brandenberg. He was referring also to the barriers in men’s minds that prevented an end to the Cold War thinking, barriers to a more comprehensive approach to how peace and security could be achieved and sustained. In seeking that more effective approach to security, it is important to note how much common ground there is in the United States across the political divide. For instance there is a great deal of overlap in the Democratic and Republic Party leaderships about how the United States should now behave in Iraq. That fact reveals how far Mr Latham's position is from the views of both the President of the United States and his political opponent. I notice, for instance, last Monday the Foreign Policy adviser to Senator Kerry, Mr James Rubin, had this to say about involvement in Iraq: ‘John Kerry has been very clear that, regardless of what you think about how we got here, here we are. And failure is not an option in Iraq. And the prospect of success in Iraq will be improved by maintaining a substantial contribution from friends and allies, including Australia.’ At a time when close cooperation with Australia’s major ally has never been more important, the position adopted by the Labor Party is strikingly at odds with the character our relationship has assumed over the years. Downgrading the US alliance is not good for Australia. Walking away from our friends when they need our support is not the kind of country we are. Those who suggest that our close alliance comes at the expense of Australia’s independence and self-reliance fail to understand the fundamentals of Australia’s defence posture in our rapidly changing security environment. The primary focus of the ADF remains the defence of Australia and supporting stability in our immediate region. But to defend Australia’s interests, there will be occasions when we choose to contribute niche capabilities to operations further afield. American military pre-eminence and a strong alliance relationship do not undermine our self-reliance. Properly understood, they help to underpin it by enhancing our capacity to respond to a wider range of developments. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC The ANZUS alliance is an essential pillar of peace, security and prosperity in our region. A secure, stable and prosperous Asia is an abiding national interest of Australia. The Government’s policies of active engagement with Asia reflect, and respect, the region’s political, economic and cultural diversity. This is the foundation of the Coalition’s sense of what engagement invariably means in practice. As the historian David Goldsworthy has stated: ‘In case after case, episode after episode, it is the particularity of different Asian states and subregions that needs to be grasped if the character of Australian engagement is to be clearly understood.’ Appreciating Asia’s diversity is central to the conduct of sensible, practical, sustainable Asian engagement. This textured story resists all attempts to make it conform to some narrow, partisan agenda. No Australian political party has a monopoly on engagement with Asia – however that might be defined. And Australians have consistently shown a studied indifference to attempts to make Australia’s relations with Asia a domestic political battleground for identity politics. Too often, simple bromides masquerading as grand strategy fail to take account of Asia’s diversity. So too they distort Australia’s position as a Western country with a unique network of political, economic and people-to-people links with Asia. What is needed, above all, is a clear sense of how to advance Australia’s prosperity and security in Asia with practical initiatives grounded in common interests. The Coalition Government builds on a tradition of constructive engagement with Asian neighbours. Strengthening economic relations has been a special focus. A little more than a decade after the Pacific war, the Menzies Government forged the great and enduring economic partnership with Japan through the 1957 Commerce Agreement – over the opposition of many including the Labor Party led by Dr Evatt. Japan remains our biggest export market and we are working to identify new areas of economic cooperation. More and more Australians are coming to see how the rise of China as a geo-political and economic power will have a profound impact on Australia’s future. With our scoping study on a free trade agreement, the Government has clearly signalled its interest in forging a strategic economic partnership with China based on far-reaching economic complementarities. Our free trade agreements with Singapore and Thailand have demonstrated the Government’s pragmatic interest in lowering trade barriers and deepening economic integration with Southeast Asia. I look forward to welcoming Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin to Australia in two weeks time to sign our agreement. I hope to have the opportunity later this year to meet with ASEAN leaders to discuss further steps towards economic cooperation. The Government is also working to strengthen Australia’s security links in the Asia-Pacific region. We have an extensive network of defence relationships in Asia with counter-terrorism cooperation of particular and growing importance. Closer to home, Australia has entered a new phase in its strategic role in the Pacific – confident to lead, confident in what we offer, and confident we are seen as partners for progress. There was a time not so long ago when sensitivities about alleged ‘neo-colonialism’ perhaps caused Australia to err on the side of passivity in our approach. Those days are behind us as we work constructively with others to address the challenges faced by our immediate neighbourhood. This new Pacific partnership is based on our willingness to commit the resources needed for decisive action and our capacity to work with our Island neighbours to identify cooperative solutions to the region’s problems. Australia has a particular responsibility to help those countries struggling to secure the basic requirements of law and order. In this context, the RAMSI mission in the Solomons serves an important demonstration – both to those who value peace and order and to those who might seek to undermine our efforts. In December 2003, Australia and Papua New Guinea entered a new era of cooperation in which Australians will work side-by-side with PNG in the areas of policing, law and justice as well as on economic and public sector management. I do not wish to understate the enormous challenges faced by many states on our doorstep. And I do not want to imply that we can simply transfer home grown solutions from Australia into completely different social, economic and political environments. But through an integrated set of measures targeted at enhancing security and strengthening governance we are determined to play our part in helping to foster stability and a brighter future in the Pacific. CONCLUSION Australia has no option but to engage with, adapt to, and help to shape a constantly changing security environment. The job of national security is never done. It continues to demand large resources, strategic flexibility and great endurance. In our region and around the world, Australia commands respect based on our military capability, our economic strength, our strong alliance relationships, our diplomatic engagement, and our willingness to take a stand. Together, they make Australia an effective force, and a force for good. There can be no retreat into splendid isolation or paradigms of the past. We cannot put a fence around our country or our region. We cannot draw back to the illusion of Fortress Australia. Nor can we take refuge in a brand of realism that offers little more than world-weary cynicism. Australians are determined to maintain one of the freest, most open, most tolerant countries in the world. Though tested in recent times, we have come through with strength and resolve. We are a naturally optimistic and confident people. Nothing will change that. We see this displayed each year when thousands of young Australians flock to the Gallipoli ceremony in Turkey. This pilgrimage is now almost de rigueur for young Australians backpacking around Europe as they remember the sacrifice of earlier generations of Australians. Today, faced with new threats in a new century, our history, our interests and our values have summoned us again to play a role on the global stage. To play our part beside our allies in a long, tough struggle against intolerance, brutality and extremism. To defend the civilised values that have made Australia the nation that it is. So an Afghan woman can go to school. So an Iraqi Kurd does not fear a knock at the door. So Australian businessmen and businesswomen can expand their offices in Beijing and Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. And yes, so a young Australian backpacker can safely go overseas and have a look around. [ends] SOURCE http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20040821-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech921.html ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- MORE Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). [est. 2001 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Strategic_Policy_Institute TV character - Yes Minister https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphrey_Appleby Federal Opposition Leaders Since 1901 http://australianpolitics.com/lists/opposition-leaders-since-1901 Mark Latham Federal Parliamentary Australian Labor Party Leader of the Opposition 2 Dec 2003 – 18 Jan 2005 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Latham Philip Bobbitt  - here Academic | philosophy law author | talking head Joseph Nye {Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr.} Academic Harvard Uni member American Academy of Diplomacy sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations (past 20 years) American political scientist w. Robert Keohane, co-founder of international relations theory neoliberalism in 1977 book Power and Interdependence Foreign Policy mag:   "All roads to understanding American foreign policy run through Joe Nye." *concepts of asymmetrical and complex interdependence *transnational relations *world politics More recently:  *pioneered theory of soft power Nye's idea of 'smart power' gained popularity b/c use of this phrase by members of the Clinton Admin = more recently used by the Obama Admin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nye ꕤ

Prof Philip Bobbitt on US Foreign Policy & Strategy

SOURCE https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/strategy-real-time-dueling-enemy-moves Strategy in Real Time: Dueling with an Enemy That Moves Global Affairs July 1, 2015 | 08:00 GMT Print By Philip Bobbitt Strategy is a two-way street. But many commentators act as though formulating a strategy is the same as solving a chess problem. Chess problems are artificially constructed arrangements on a chessboard where the goal is to find a series of moves that leaves the other side no room to evade a checkmate within three or four turns. The sorts of conflicts bedeviling us these days, however, are more like the game of chess itself, in which there is no determinate, continuous series of moves that will guarantee victory every time. Each new contest depends on the actions of the other side, how we react to them, how they respond to our reactions, and so on. Ignoring this aspect of strategy seems to contribute to the widespread view that victory in warfare amounts to the destruction of the enemy, a facile assumption that is all too unthinkingly held. "Defeating the enemy" may be the definition of victory in football, or even in chess for that matter, but not in warfare. Victory in war is the achievement of the war aim, and if, after Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, we still think that victory is simply the devastation of our adversaries, we have a lot of reflecting to do. The Triage of Terror In my last column, I referred to the idea of the "triage of terror," which I discuss further in my book, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. The wars against terror comprise preventing transnational terrorist attacks, precluding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for the purposes of compellence rather than deterrence, and protecting civilians from widespread depredation and destruction. Unfortunately, progress in any one of the three theaters of conflict composing the wars on terror often increases the challenges we face in the other theaters. Managing the interrelationship of the three spheres of engagement in a way that prevents success in one arena from grossly exacerbating matters in another — the "triage of terror" — is an important objective of statecraft. For example, a strategy that relies on intervention to suppress the gross violation of human rights through genocide or ethnic cleansing may make states that fear becoming the targets of intervention more anxious to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Strategies that attempt to root out terrorism are often linked to ethnic or sectarian repression or the aggressive repression of human rights. Preemptive counterproliferation strategies by the world's strongest military power could summon burgeoning terrorist armies that challenge the United States through asymmetric means. Understanding the consequences that success in one arena may have for the other wars on terror is a prerequisite for devising an effective strategy in the 21st century. When asked on "Face the Nation" about the Obama administration's commitment to the War on Terror, CIA Director John Brennan said, There has been a full-court effort to try to keep this country safe. Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, others, these are some of the most complex and complicated issues that I’ve seen in 35 years working on national security issues. So there are no easy solutions. I think the president has tried to make sure that we’re able to push the envelope when we can to protect this country. But we have to recognize that sometimes our engagement and direct involvement will stimulate and spur additional threats to our national security interests. This rather wise and sober assessment prompted something like a scream from the Council on Foreign Relations, which labeled it an "unprecedented recognition" that U.S. "foreign policy can harm U.S. national security." The commentator added that "the next public interview with the CIA director should begin by asking him which engagements and direct involvements he is referring to," and demanded that "Brennan's unprecedented recognition [be] further explored and commented on by the White House, State Department and Department of Defense." But of course we know which engagements Brennan was referring to because he told us in the very passage quoted. What he did not say was that our foreign policy harms our national security. Far from being an astounding concession, Brennan's remarks linking our actions to our enemies' responses were a rather insightful and realistic observation that would electrify only a careless listener. To highlight the distinction between "stimulating additional threats" and "harming U.S. national security," let me turn to another concept mentioned in my first column: Parmenides' Fallacy. Parmenides' Fallacy This fallacy indulges in the frequent, unthinking assertion that we should compare the present state of affairs with the past in order to evaluate the policies that have gotten us to where we are now. In fact, we should compare our current situation with alternative outcomes that would have arisen from different policies, had they been chosen. This is true for prospective policies as well: It is a sophist's [Ancient Greek philosophy teacher's] argument to deride a proposed policy (say, social security reform or free trade) by simply saying we will be worse off after the policy is implemented than we are now. That may well be true. But it could be true of even the wisest policy if other alternatives, including doing nothing, would make us even worse off in the future. Let me give a famous example of Parmenides' Fallacy at work. The turning point in the United States' 1980 presidential race came when Ronald Reagan criticized President Jimmy Carter's record during a debate by asking the American people, "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" Though rhetorically devastating, this question is hardly the way to evaluate a presidency. After all, the state of the nation will never stay the same for four years, regardless of who is in office. A more relevant question would have been, "Are you better off now than you would have been if Gerald Ford had remained the president and had had to cope with rising oil prices, the Iranian Revolution, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and soaring interest rates?" In the same way, we should reframe fallacious prospective questions like, "Will we be better off in five years than we are now if we adopt a certain policy?" The better question to ask is, "Will we be better off in five years by adopting this policy than we will be in five years if we do not?" Real Strategy in Real Time We are not necessarily harming national security when we take steps to counter threats that cause our enemies to react in a way that creates new threats. That, in fact, is the essence of strategy:  It is not to dream up a series of unilateral actions that will inevitably lead to the accomplishment of our goals, but to recognize that each measure we take will invariably lead to countermeasures, and to anticipate the ultimate costs of reactions, both ours and theirs. Everyone has a strategy, Mike Tyson famously said, until he gets punched in the mouth. An example of such non-strategic thinking is the idea that the United States is chiefly responsible for its problems, since other states have not wreaked the costs on America that we ourselves have undertaken in the name of deterring them. As another commentator recently observed, "if you look at the past 25 years or so, it is abundantly clear that external enemies have done far less damage to the United States than we have done to ourselves." This confident assertion ("it is abundantly clear") is not a clinching argument, indeed it is not an argument at all. It is merely a rhetorical flourish, and a rather indolent one at that. To be an argument, we would have to know what damage our external enemies would have done to us and to our allies if we had not appropriated large sums for defense and intelligence, if we had not prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and Libya, and if we had not stopped the ethnic massacres in Europe. The debate on U.S. strategy is a timely one, and nothing I have said is a defense of U.S. policies, past or present. Rather, it is a lament that the debate is being pursued in the such terms as these, which add little to our assessment of the wisdom of any particular policy including especially those policies that attempt to achieve our war aims. But the shortcomings of this approach are not merely analytical. There are practical consequences of defining strategy as that which we do, which is to strategy what shadow boxing is to boxing. For this approach often manifests itself in a kind of aphasia: If strategy is what we do, regardless of the actions of others, then there is an inevitable bias toward doing nothing, responding to challenges with a portentous silence. Like aphasia generally it is associated with trauma (like a stroke), and the trauma out of which this silence has emerged is the Vietnam War (for my generation) and perhaps the ill-fated intervention in Iraq for those of a younger age. This attitude can be seen on yard signs and bumper stickers that read: "Stop War: Get out of ____" (fill in the blank: the Balkans, the Baltics, the Middle East). I suppose some people really do believe that if U.S. forces simply leave the field, conflict will abate (as it did in Vietnam after a good deal of political, religious, class and ethnic "cleansing" by Hanoi) and as may yet happen in Iraq should the war there lead to partition after a truly awful period of sectarian violence. We should be careful to distinguish between two groups who seek such American restraint. Some simply hold that, but for U.S. intervention, there would be no war in the world. For this group, the specter of American imperialism lurks behind all the conflicts of the 20th century. Others, however, believe that—whatever the ensuing violence that might follow an American withdrawal, or the violence that might continue undiminished in the absence of an American intervention—the use of U.S. force abroad is more damaging than beneficial to American interests. The irony is that while both these groups criticize U.S. policy for being "unilateralist," they are united in advocating a policy that is unilateral in the extreme, for what act could be more autonomous than removing oneself from conflict regardless of the consequences for others? The first group, who see the conspiratorial reflex of American militarism in every significant conflict around the world might wish to pause and ask themselves whether the world is really better for others—for the peoples of the world who don’t live in the United States—if violence is unchecked by U.S. intervention, for this group professes to be principally concerned about the welfare of other peoples even when American interests are at stake. It should give them pause that polls consistently show that a large majority of Iraqis still support the regime change brought about by the American-led coalition, however angry they are about the feckless occupation that followed. The second group, however, is my principal concern. Putting irony aside, one can’t help but notice that this perspective ignores the value of U.S. alliances, a value that distinguishes us from our principal potential adversaries in the world and which, in my view, is our greatest strategic asset. Real strategy is not just what we do, but it also encompasses more than what our adversaries do. Real strategy is as much about our allies, our potential allies, our potential enemies, and the great body of states and peoples that could go either way. The late Sir Michael Quinlan observed that in conflict we are always likely to be surprised. That is because we prepare our defenses for the attacks we anticipate and so inevitably drive our opponents to pursue the tactics and strategies against targets we have not foreseen. We have been so often surprised these last several decades—sometimes happily so, oftentimes not—that it must be alluring to imagine that strategies of non-engagement at the least would spare us those surprises that haunt American policy. This is an enervated [weak] fantasy. When we are disengaged—when we are not trying to prepare the field for potential conflict and preclude situations that put us at a disadvantage—every act that threatens us and our allies comes as a surprise. SOURCE https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/strategy-real-time-dueling-enemy-moves ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- COMMENT The CIA director is talking rubbish when he speaks of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, in the same breath as keeping the US 'safe' (but I guess that depends on how you define 'the US' ... lol): "...  full-court effort to try to keep this country safe.  Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya ..." That's just an excuse for US intervention in these remote countries that pose zero threat to distant, powerful, mainland USA. What I think he's really saying is ... we've interfered in all these crazy countries; it's ugly, nasty, and vicious, ... and you can expect some blow-back as a result of this interference.  But, hey, this is just part of strategy - and you're now part of the collateral damage involved in pursuing this strategy of military meddling abroad.  Or, something like that.  Bobbit describes Brennan's sales pitch as a 'rather wise and sober assessment' ... but that's probably because he's in the same political camp as the CIA (and whoever controls the CIA). Bobbit's, the one-man CIA / US interventionist policy cheer squad, the way I see it. Bobbit tells us Brennan didn't say US "foreign policy harms [US] national security,"  before pulling a rabbit out of his hat by drawing on distinctions between: "stimulating additional threats" and "harming US national security." So the 'additional threats' blow-back generated by US foreign policy is no biggie, and you guys:  just have to wear that? It gets even better:  not only is the blowback no big deal, folks, ... it's not even the result of US foreign policy. Wow, that's what you call:  a Magician. Never mind that US actions abroad are the extensions of US foreign policy.  Never mind that, reactions to US actions abroad - are, by extension,  reactions US foreign policy.  And, nasty comb-back is, therefore, really the nasty fruit of US foreign policy. But, of course, that doesn't matter to the policy makers.  What really matters is US foreign policy.   So, it's:  policy above all else. The 'additional threats' (ie what is dismissed as collateral to pursuit of US foreign policy) - be it abroad or domestically - is secondary to the broader agenda of US foreign policy.  The foreign policy agenda is an agenda that doesn't have anything to do with the average American:  an agenda involving regional allies in remote territories, and an agenda involving strategic regional aims, in the service of corporate interests and the allies of corporate interests. The philosopher of law launches into what, to me, appears to be an argument about the structure of argument. I'm no logician or philosopher, but this entire argument as to construct of argument sounds like a con to me. Reframing the question: " ... we should reframe fallacious prospective questions like, "Will we be better off in five years than we are now if we adopt a certain policy?" The better question to ask is, "Will we be better off in five years by adopting this policy than we will be in five years if we do not?"" is an interesting technique.  But what's the point? In the above example, it looks as though you isolate the proposed policy from the current benefits (and yardstick for evaluation), and evaluate a proposed policy on a stand-alone basis ... of projection of some kind?  Not quite sure.  This definitely sounds like a load of garbage (to me): "if you look at the past 25 years or so, it is abundantly clear that external enemies have done far less damage to the United States than we have done to ourselves." "It is not an argument at all. It is merely a rhetorical flourish, and a rather indolent one at that. To be an argument, we would have to know what damage our external enemies would have done to us and to our allies if we had not appropriated large sums for defense and intelligence" It's an argument in which the security state justifies its own existence (and the policies and funding that keep the security state (war state, really) enormous and aggressive etc), by stating that critics have no argument unless they can indicate what would have happened had the government not spent an enormous amount of money on the corporate war chest and intelligence.  Maybe critics ought to look at what value for money these organisations have actually produced (ie what acts did they prevent etc), minus the costs to the entire nation - and to future generations servicing interest payable on corporate war debt, masked as national debt for 'security'. Expect that neocon US interventionist foreign policy promos shall be pitched on the basis of not only commercial interests (passed off as 'US interests,'  'national interests' or 'national security'), but also rationalised as 'altruistic' concern for the welfare of 'allies', as a rationalisation for past intervention, and as a pretext for ongoing and future intervention, on behalf of commercial interests, at US national cost. What on earth is the following: " ... if we had not prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and Libya, and if we had not stopped the ethnic massacres in Europe." Everybody knows 'weapons of mass destruction' was a false pretext used to invade Iraq; Libya has been destroyed by the West ... and now there's chaos & jihadists running amok (and it looks like entire populations of the Middle East and Africa are moving into Europe, via Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, when entering by Turkey or Greece rather than by Italy).  And those much-invoked US-Anglo refrains of 'ethnic massacres in Europe,' are Western propaganda that has been used as a pretext (and an aftermath rationalisation) for the US-Anglo alliance intervention in the Balkans (where the US has gained control & set up yet another US military base in Kosovo - Camp Bondsteel, described as a small Guantanamo). If there's any sectarian violence in Iraq, it will be because the US and allies demolished a functioning state; so there's no use lamenting that people want the US out of foreign countries, as if it is the rightful US place to intervene abroad, for some 'altruistic' reason (when nothing could be further from the truth). The US military invasion is rationalised as an act of kindness: " ... whether the world is really better for others—for the peoples of the world who don’t live in the United States—if violence is unchecked by U.S. intervention" as if the US is a kindly, freelance, 'policeman' of the world ... 'preventing' violence:  when, in fact, the US is visiting violence upon the world. As for the Iraq poll, even we accept these 'polls' are not a crock of self-serving sh*t, we can hardly equate these ridiculous polls with: Thank you ever so much for invading & destroying our country, killing half a million of our people directly, and another 1.7 million indirectly ... for a profitable future 'greater good,' as seen by Americans and their allies. What I got mostly out of this is:  American interventions all over over the world are mostly about the interests of allies of US corporate interests.  So the Middle Eastern mayhem is probably on account of Saudi Arabia and Israel, as US allies? [ Just my everyday person take on things.  Not based on extensive knowledge. ] FURTHER READING 10th Anniversary Of US Iraq Invasion: 2.7 Million Iraqi Deaths By Dr Gideon Polya 20 March, 2013 This week it is exactly ten years after the US , UK and Australia illegally invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003 on the utterly false and illegitimate excuse that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  The invasion occurred after over 12 years of deadly sanctions, war and bombing that had devastated the infrastructure of Iraq , violently killed 0.2 million Iraqis in the Gulf War and killed 1.7 million Iraqis through war-imposed deprivation  ... http://www.countercurrents.org/polya200313.htm *Figures don't look right to me.  Believe it's half a million direct death toll for Iraq (not 0.2 million) referred to above.  Just quickly skimmed.  Have not gone into wide search or detail.  Surprised to find Australia involved in the illegal invasion.  Australian PM of the day (who happens to be a Prof Philip Bobbit fan): John Howard 11 Mar 1996 – 3 Dec 2007 ꕤ

Parmenides' Fallacy

---------------------- ꕤ ----------------------  Parmenides' Fallacy COPYRIGHT DISCLAIMER Copyright Disclaimer under section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for “fair use” for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, education and research.

Parmenides a Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher born in Italy; held the metaphysical view that being is the basic substance and ultimate reality of which all things are composed; said that motion and change are sensory illusions (5th century BC) SOURCE | ABOVE http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/Parmenides ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- SOURCE | BELOW Forbes Margie Warrell Contributor Book:  Stop Playing Safe http://www.forbes.com/sites/margiewarrell/2013/03/19/the-parmenides-fallacy-are-you-ignoring-the-cost-of-inaction/  EXTRACTS / SUMMARY Bad situation indecision = stuck with status quo hoping things get better (but they get worse) Human beings are neurologically wired to: over-estimate the size of risks under-estimate our ability to handle them downplay the costs of inaction "... by choosing not to make a change or take a chance ... you can wind up incurring steep costs, in ways you can’t possibly foresee from where you are right now" [ REFERS TO ] "Professor Philip Bobbit from the University of Texas has even given a name to the human tendency to assume the present situation will remain the same. He calls it ‘Parmenides Fallacy,’ after the misguided Greek philosopher who argued that the world was static and that all change was an illusion." result:  "drives us to stick with the status quo – even one we dislike" "Parmenides Fallacy serves as a reminder to not to kid ourselves; choosing to do nothing..." SOURCE | ABOVE Forbes Margie Warrell Contributor Book:  Stop Playing Safe http://www.forbes.com/sites/margiewarrell/2013/03/19/the-parmenides-fallacy-are-you-ignoring-the-cost-of-inaction/  Margie Warrell Error 404 - page not found http://margiewarrell.com/stopplayinsafe Margie Warrell "an international thought leader in human potential" "professional background in Fortune 500 business, psychology, and coaching" "Her clients include NASA, British Telecom, Oracle, Body Shop, PWC and the Australian Federal Police." "bestselling author, Forbes Columnist  ..." " ... sought out by leading media outlets such as The Today Show, FOX News, CNBC and Al Jazeera, Psychology Today and Wall Street Journal. She is also a regular contributor on Australia’s ABC News Breakfast and Sunrise.    ...  international media outlets from the Wall Street Journal to The Today Show. She is also regular commentator on Australia’s Sunrise and ABC News Breakfast." http://margiewarrell.com/ ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- SOURCE - BELOW Aakash "I am a speck of dust in this universe, who is going to create a whole new universe someday." http://logically-illogical.blogspot.com/2008/02/parmenides-fallacy.html Parmenides' Fallacy All our decisions are generally based upon the measurement of the future benefits that can be drawn by making that decision. How will it make us better of than what we presently are. This is the fundamental clause in the decision making of most of the managers while making any investment. But what is interesting to note is that the things in the normal circumstances will constantly deteriorate in their own. So, if we don't take any decision then we might be worse off in future than what we are now. So, if the investment is made then it might be that we would be worse off than now but better off than we would have been without it.  [ ... ] SOURCE - ABOVE Aakash "I am a speck of dust in this universe, who is going to create a whole new universe someday." http://logically-illogical.blogspot.com/2008/02/parmenides-fallacy.html ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- SOURCE - BELOW Opinion, NYT Today's War Is Against Tomorrow's Iraq By PHILIP BOBBITT Philip Bobbitt, a law professor at the University of Texas Published: March 10, 2003 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/10/opinion/10BOBB.html EXTRACTS ONLY President Bush has again made his case for war against Iraq, and again his primary argument is the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to America. The president's critics are quick to point out that the Central Intelligence Agency and other experts feel that, for the moment, Saddam Hussein is unlikely to conduct terrorist attacks against America. However, they warn us, if an invasion threatens his regime, his agents or his extremist sympathizers might well attack us — possibly even using weapons of mass destruction. So is it really a good idea to press ahead with regime change? Aren't we better off now than we would be if we invade Iraq and risk setting off a dreadful response? These are natural questions, but they are neither logical nor helpful. They are a prime example in our public discourse of what might be called "Parmenides' Fallacy" — named after the Greek philosopher who held that all change was illusion. This fallacy occurs when one tries to assess a future state of affairs by measuring it against the present, as opposed to comparing it to other possible futures. Let me give a famous example of Parmenides' Fallacy in operation. [...] So, as we look to the future, we must stop debating whether invading Iraq will result in our being worse down the line than we are right now. We do not have the option of holding time still — which exposes the biggest flaw in the "Why Rush to War?" argument. The urgency lies in the fact that every day Saddam Hussein stays in power he grows richer, the global terrorist network to which he has access plans further atrocities and (international inspections notwithstanding) the chance of his acquiring nuclear, chemical and biological weapons grows. To avoid Parmenides' Fallacy, the question we must ask is: Will we be better off in the future if we invade Iraq or if we do not invade? [ ... ] We should also consider the future of the Iraqi civilians. Yes, they would suffer the horrors of war in the near term, which for a time would be even worse than life under the sanctions now. But if an American-led intervention succeeded, the country's oil revenues could once again enrich its people, as well as its schools, hospitals and financial institutions. The Iraqis would be much better off after an invasion than they would be living indefinitely chained to Saddam Hussein. For us, though we live in relative tranquillity at present, we will at least be far less badly off in the future if we act now. Parmenides' Fallacy must not paralyze our imaginations, or our will. SOURCE - ABOVE Opinion, NYT Today's War Is Against Tomorrow's Iraq By PHILIP BOBBITT Philip Bobbitt, a law professor at the University of Texas Published: March 10, 2003 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/10/opinion/10BOBB.html ---------------------- ꕤ ---------------------- SOURCE - BELOW https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Bobbitt EXTRACTS |  SUMMARY Philip Bobbitt b. Texas, USA distinguished pedigree author, academic, lawyer, and public servant lectured in the United Kingdom best known for work on military strategy & constitutional law and theory Attended: Princeton University Yale Law School Oxford University graduated with an A.B. in philosophy | Princeton University in 1971 president of the Ivy Club and Chairman of the Nassau Lit. 1975 J.D. from Yale Law School, where he was Article Editor of the Yale Law Journal and taught at Yale College at Yale that he met Charles L. Black (1915–2001), who became a mentor to Bobbitt received his M.A & Ph.D. (Modern History) | University of Oxford in 1983 J.D. =  three-year law degree, Doctor Jurisprudence "... word jurisprudence derives from the Latin term juris prudentia, which means "the study, knowledge, or science of law." In the United States jurisprudence commonly means the philosophy of law." [Cornell Uni - example] Charles Black (professor) American scholar of constitutional law  role in the historic Brown v. Board of Education *landmark USA 1954 case* US Supreme Court declared establishment of "separate public schools for black and white students to be unconstitutional." Impeachment: A Handbook  analysis of the law of impeachment during the Watergate scandal. served in the Army Air Corps as a teacher an associate at Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl  (now Davis, Polk & Wardwell) professor of law at the Columbia University Law School "... He had the moral courage to go against his race, his class, his social circle." "Black also co-authored The Law of Admiralty with Grant Gilmore .. ... constitutional legal scholar ... "The Law of Admiralty" is one of the most influential law books ever written in a practical area of law. Admiralty is the law of the sea, of shipping and shipping contracts, and is a functional, practical area of international law, in which uniformity of the application of law in ports throughout the world is important, and as a result it has evolved somewhat differently from other areas of federal law. "Gilmore and Black," ... so influential that it is one of the few treatises that federal admiralty and international courts cite almost as though ... a primary source of law ..."  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Black_%28professor%29 ---------------------- ꕤ  ----------------------  Consitutional Law - Philip Bobbit "... believes that the Constitution's durability rests, in part, in the flexible manner in which it can be and has been interpreted since its creation. ... Bobbitt asserts that all branches of government have a duty to assess the constitutionality of their actions. 'Constitutional Fate' is a commonly used text in courses on constitutional law throughout the US." Government Service - Philip Bobbit extensively in government, for both Democratic and Republican administrations 1970s, he was Associate Counsel to President Carter  Senior director for Critical Infrastructure & senior director for Strategic Planning - Bill Clinton's presidency worked with Lloyd Cutler on the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Lloyd Cutler Intelligence Commission served as White House Counsel during the Democratic administrations of Presidents Carter and Clinton Feb 2004 Lloyd Cutler  appointed to Iraq Intelligence Commission (IIC) IIC = independent panel tasked with investigating US intelligence surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the allegations that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction Counselor for International Law at State Dept during George H. W. Bush administration served at National Security Council as director for Intelligence Programs National Security Council (NSC) principal forum re national security & foreign policy US President, National Security Advisors, + Cabinet officials { = part of Executive Office of President of USA} Founded by Harry S Truman 1947 - by NATIONAL SECURITY ACT b/c "felt that the diplomacy of State Dept was no longer adequate to contain the USSR" - - - Intent:  coordination & agreement among: Navy Marine Corps Army Air Force Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  {also created in the National Security Act, 1947}  & other instruments of national security policy Function: ASSIST ON NATIONAL SECURITY & FOREIGN POLICY The Shield of Achilles - Philip Bobbit " ... 900-page work that explicates a theory, verging on philosophy, of historical change in the modern era, and a history of the development of modern constitutional and international law." "...  patterns in the (mainly modern European) history of strategic innovations, major wars, peace conferences, international diplomacy, and constitutional standards for states. Bobbitt also suggests possible future scenarios and policies appropriate to them." "The Shield of Achilles generated much interest in the diplomatic and political community.  Public officials who follow Bobbitt's works include: the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair ... the former Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, who referred to Bobbit's book in a 2004 address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute." Terror and Consent (2008) "... the Wars for the Twenty-first Century, which applied many of the ideas of The Shield of Achilles to the problems of wars on terror." " ... Senator John McCain praised the book as "the best book I’ve ever read on terrorism ..."  "... Henry Kissinger called Bobbitt, "perhaps the most important political philosopher today."  Tony Blair wrote of Terror and Consent:  "It may be written by an academic but it is actually required reading for political leaders."  David Cameron, the leader of the Tory party in the UK  put it on a list of summer reading for his parliamentary colleagues in 2008.  ---------------------- ꕤ  ----------------------  In Terror & Consent, Bobbitt argued that the only justification for warfare in the 21st century was to protect human rights ---------------------- ꕤ  ---------------------- The Garments of Court and Palace  " ... 2013, Bobbitt published a study of Niccolo Machiavelli entitled The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World That He Made. " "...  argues that only by understanding The Prince as one half of a constitutional treatise on the State (the other being Machiavelli's Discourses) can we reconcile the many otherwise contradictory elements of his work." [emphasises] " ... what he describes as Machiavelli’s reification [reification =error of treating something which is not concrete -eg an idea - as a concrete thing] of the state as an entity with its own reality that is not to be identified with the personal power of the prince. "... especially worth emphasizing in view of the fact that the term state is so often used ... as little more than a synonym for government." "... Bobbitt has already stressed in The Shield of Achilles how much is lost if we refuse to conceptualize the state as a distinct apparatus of power, and he now points to Machiavelli as the originator of this line of thought." "... 2004 Prospect Magazine named him One of Britain's Top 100 Public Intellectuals.  ... writes essays, typically on foreign policy, published in The New York Times, and The Guardian." SOURCE - ABOVE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Bobbitt ---------------------- ꕤ  ---------------------- ASIDE Davis, Polk & Wardwell founded in 1849 multiple name changes international law firm HQ NYC described as:  "Tiffany's of law firms" Revenue:  $975 million (2013) John W. Davis former US Solicitor General |  1924 Democratic presidential nominee US Supreme Court Brown v. Board of Education represented South Carolina  |  in defence of racial segregation Davis developed close ties between the firm and: J.P. Morgan companies Guaranty Trust Company Associated Press International Paper firm represented numerous clients in the financial crisis of 2007-2008 lead counsel to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York {U.S. Treasury’s $250 billion bank capital purchase program} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davis_Polk_%26_Wardwell ---------------------- ꕤ  ---------------------- ꕤ