HAMAS - COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OVERVIEW

Council on Foreign Relations HAMAS Hamas is a Palestinian militant movement ... one of the territories' two major political parties. A nationalist-Islamist spinoff of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was founded in 1987, during the first intifada [uprising], and later emerged at the forefront of armed resistance to Israel. The United States and the European Union consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Its rival party, Fatah, which dominates the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has renounced violence. The support Hamas garners among Palestinians largely owes to the foil it plays to Fatah, which many see as having grown corrupted by power while delivering little through its peaceful cooperation and negotiation with Israel. Hamas candidates won Palestinian elections in 2006, but their government was dismissed in 2007, resulting in the political bifurcation [splitting in two] of the West Bank and Gaza. While Fatah reasserted its authority in the West Bank, Hamas has exercised de facto rule over the Gaza Strip in the years since. Funding As a designated terrorist entity, Hamas is cut off from official assistance that the United States and European Union provide to the PLO in the West Bank. Historically, much of its funding came from Palestinian expatriates and private donors in the Gulf. In addition, some Islamic charities in the West have channeled money to Hamas-backed social service groups, prompting asset freezes by the U.S. Treasury. Egypt and Israel largely closed their borders with Gaza in 2006–2007, restricting the movement of goods and people into and out of the territory. Israel also maintains a maritime blockade. Until recently, a sophisticated network of more than a thousand tunnels circumvented the Egyptian crossing, allowing staples such as food, medicine, and cheap gas for electricity production into the territory, as well as construction materials, cash, and arms. The illicit trade provided some material relief for Gazans, while Hamas levied a tax on the traffic, a major source of its revenue. Changing regional circumstances have not only isolated Hamas politically but also put severe strains on its coffers. With the ascension of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's military-backed government in 2013–14, Cairo is hostile to Hamas, which it sees as an extension of its chief domestic rival, the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army has shut down most of the tunnels entering into its territory in the course of waging a counterinsurgency campaign on its side of the border, in the Sinai Peninsula. Hamas distanced itself from Iran, its primary benefactor, due to Tehran's support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his regime's repression of antigovernment activists beginning in 2011. Iran reportedly cut funding to Hamas in the fallout, and sought to bolster its ties to other resistance groups in the region, such as Islamic Jihad. Qatar's financial support largely dried up as well, collateral damage of the Gulf country's efforts to mend ties with its neighbors, with whom it had fallen out in part for backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The cumulative effect of these financial pressures helped push Hamas toward a reconciliation deal with Fatah in April 2014. Yet despite the deal, the Palestinian Authority has not provided salaries for the more than forty thousand Gazan public servants hired by Hamas, which many analysts believe was a contributing factor to the latest outbreak of violence. As Governing Party Hamas' primary base of operation is in the Gaza Strip, the coastal enclave of 1.7 million Palestinians, where it has remained the de facto authority since shortly after Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2005. The following year, Hamas surprised Western observers by winning a majority of seats by a narrow margin and forming a government. It may have earned votes as a protest movement and for the social services it provided, but the win was likely more a rejection of the incumbent Fatah, which was widely perceived as having grown corrupt at the helm of the PLO and delivering little to Palestinians with its program of negotiation. The outcome was unacceptable to the PLO, which ousted Hamas from power in the West Bank. In Gaza, Hamas routed Fatah's militias in a week of internecine fighting, resulting in a political schism between the two Palestinian territories. As it took over the remnants of PA institutions in the strip, it established such governmental structures as a judiciary and put in place authoritarian institutions. Hamas restricts the Gazan media, the political opposition, and nongovernmental organizations, leaving few mechanisms of accountability. Meanwhile, most Gazans receive social services from UN agencies and humanitarian organizations. "Hamas remains more hard-line than the public it seeks to lead," says Nathan Brown, a scholar of political Islam. The group suffers from relatively low support among Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank. Palestinian pollsters found in early 2014 that in hypothetical legislative elections, Hamas would fall far short of the majority it won in 2006, including among its Gazan base. Fatah garners only marginally greater support. Both parties suffer from the absence of political legitimacy, says CFR's Robert Danin. Rather than a common political agenda, they entered into the reconciliation deal to facilitate new Palestinian elections and break the stagnation in Palestinian politics, he says. Palestinians have not voted for a president since 2008, nor a legislature since 2006, and the political bifurcation [splitting in two] between the West Bank and Gaza is widely unpopular. As Armed Resistance The second intifada [uprising] ended in early 2005 as Israeli security forces grew more successful at thwarting suicide attacks and moved against militant groups in the West Bank. Though Hamas gave up suicide bombing, it remained committed to armed resistance, and as it entrenched in the Gaza Strip, it took to launching rockets and mortars into Israeli territory. The crude weapons are by nature indiscriminate, but also ineffective; ten Israeli civilians were killed between January 2009 and May 2014, according to the Israeli rights group B'Tselem. It has also attempted incursions into Israeli territory, most famously kidnapping Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006. Five years later, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners to secure Shalit's release. Yet as Hamas consolidated its authority in Gaza, Israel came to rely on it to contain more radical resistance groups, such as Islamic Jihad. Since Operation Cast Lead, Israel's twenty-two day invasion in the winter of 2008–2009, long periods of détente [relaxation]  between Hamas and Israel have been the norm, a state of mutual deterrence the Israeli government has described as "quiet for quiet." But that state of deterrence is a fragile one, punctuated by intermittent volleys of rockets fired by Gazan militants into Israel and retaliatory Israeli air strikes to degrade their arsenals, a cycle Israelis have come to know as "mowing the lawn." Periods of quiet allowed Hamas and other militant groups to expand and modernize their arsenals of rockets. Egypt brokered a ceasefire that ended a round of fighting in March 2012. Israel effectively delegated to Hamas responsibility for enforcing it by withholding rocket fire and restraining more radical groups in Gaza. In 2013, sixty-three rockets were launched at Israel from Gaza, compared to 2,327 the year prior, according to the Shin Bet, Israel's security agency. In the West Bank, meanwhile, Hamas has been driven underground. Its social and military infrastructure has been dismantled, and many of its members arrested by PA and Israeli security forces. Many Palestinians saw Fatah's security cooperation as a cynical maneuver to crush its rivals. Negotiations between Israel and the PA have generally assumed Hamas would act as a spoiler. Not only would a final-status agreement likely violate its founding principles, but it would also marginalize the movement while vindicating its chief rival, Fatah. A Way Forward? The United States and European Union provisionally recognized the Palestinian reconciliation government [what is that?], which the U.S. State Department characterized as "technocratic," and said did "not include ministers affiliated with Hamas." A government including ministers from Hamas would have triggered a foreign aid cut-off, as Hamas has not recognized the three principles insisted on by the Quartet (the United States, EU, UN, and Russia): renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of prior international agreements. Hamas entered into the arrangement politically and economically weak. But in the weeks since, public support for Abbas and the PA has withered due to the collapse of nine months of intensive negotiations aiming to achieve a final-status agreement—the long-sought two-state solution—and the PA's security cooperation during the events that precipitated the current round of violence. In June 2014, Netanyahu accused Hamas of kidnapping and murdering three Israeli teens in the West Bank. Israeli security forces rearrested some of the Palestinian ex-convicts released in the Shalit deal, accusing them of recidivism. Indications that a rogue cell carried out the abductions highlighted that the movement's leadership is unable to control all those affiliated with it, analysts said. Israel responded militarily to the volley of rockets from Gaza that followed. Netanyahu has said he seeks to degrade Hamas' military capacities and restory calm, while politicians on his right flank have called for a broader ground operation that might decisively defeat Hamas, but could result in Israel once again occupying Gaza. Meanwhile, negotiations that would vindicate Abbas' approach over that of Hamas are not in the offing. The most plausible off-ramp, some analysts say, is a deal in which Hamas would disarm in exchange for economic relief for Gaza. But Israeli security concerns have been heightened by revelations of a tunnel infrastructure under the Gaza-Israel border. Israel, then, is even less likely to permit transfers of the construction materials that are necessary to rebuild Gaza. It is unclear whether the reconciliation government can survive this round of violence, particularly if Hamas emerges from it politically empowered. If it survives, some argue, elections can integrate Gaza into Palestinian politics and provide the underpinnings of a more robust cease-fire. A terrorist designation precludes the United States and European Union from speaking directly with Hamas, but Washington has turned to Turkey and Qatar as interlocutors. Additional Resources The Economist's Nicolas Pelham discusses the economics of Gaza's illicit tunnel trade and the emergence of a Hamas-led bureaucracy regulating it. Isolating Gaza has counterproductively entrenched Hamas, writes CFR's Robert Danin, who calls for Gaza's integration in the Palestinian economy and political institutions to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. [...] Leadership Hamas has a host of leadership bodies that perform various political, military, and social functions. According to the U.S. State Department, general policy is set by an overarching consultative body, often referred to as its politburo, which operates in exile.  Local committees manage grassroots issues in Gaza and the West Bank. Crisis Guide: The Israeli-Palestinian Khaled Meshaal has served as political chief since 1996. The former teacher has been based in Doha [Qatar] since Hamas fell out with Meshaal's previous host, Syria, as Palestinian refugees joined predominantly Sunni protestors in calling for reforms beginning in 2011, prompting a violent government backlash, and eventually, civil war. He is Hamas' most frequent interlocutor with the PA and regional governments. Gaza's de facto prime minister is Ismail Haniyeh, who served as PA prime minister during the brief period between the 2006 legislative elections and his dismissal by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas the following year. Marwan Issa and Mohammed Deif command Hamas' military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Israeli forces assassinated the militia's founder, Salah Shehadeh, in a 2002 airstrike. Fifteen civilians were killed in the attack, focusing Israeli and international scrutiny on such tactics. Yassin, Hamas' founder, was assassinated in 2004. Salah al-Arouri is believed to direct Hamas' armed activities in the West Bank from overseas. http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968

Recapping my undertanding:

• Hamas has de facto government status in Gaza because it is up against US and EU non-recognition.  What's EU got to do with it?  
• Presumably because US has decided Israel falls within their 'Eucom' miltary controls, even though it is in the Middle East.
• Hamas designated a terrorist organisation because Hamas stands by armed resistance.
• Previously suicide bombings; but have stopped.
• Hamas cut off from direct communications with US and with EU, because of the US and EU terrorist designation.
• Hamas also cut off from 'official assistance' from US and EU (but it's rival Fatah in West Bank get assistance because they're playing by Israel, US and EU rules? -- or because US and EU don't deal directly with Hamas, so it is down to Fatah to distribute the money?]
• In 2011, Israel had 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.
• The Palestinians are blocked off on a sliver of land.
• Israel also maintains a sea blockade.
• Israel appears to have had some kind of accord and periods of truce with Hamas, as long as Hamas contained extreme groups?

The Gaza Palestinians are virtual prisoners and they dig tunnels:

network of more than a thousand tunnels circumvented the Egyptian crossing, allowing staples such as food, medicine, and cheap gas for electricity production into the territory, as well as construction materials, cash, and arms.

The main issue (I think) is that Hamas/Gaza will not:

1. Disarm / renounce violent resistance.
2. Recognise Israel.
3. Accept prior Agreements (see Oslo I Accords - here).  

I've not read the accords info in its entirety.

But gist is:  Fatah signed the Oslo accords - Hamas objected.
So why would Hamas now decide it wants the accord?

Then there is this interesting aside:

In a 2001 video, Netanyahu, reportedly unaware he was being recorded, said: "They asked me before the election if I'd honor [the Oslo accords]... I said I would, but [that] I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders. How did we do it? Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone. Go argue."  Netanyahu then explained how he conditioned his signing of the 1997 Hebron agreement on American consent that there be no withdrawals from "specified military locations", and insisted he be allowed to specify which areas constituted a "military location"—such as the whole of the Jordan Valley. "Why is that important? Because from that moment on I stopped the Oslo Accords", Netanyahu affirmed. [wikipedia]

I'm not 100% clear on what Netanyahu's getting at, but I gather the Oslo accords agreement is worthless if you're a Palestinian wanting to reclaim land pursuant to 1967 borders?

Under the circumstances, it's not surprising there's resistance.

When there is resistance, it's ineffectual (crude weapons; 2009-2014 - ten (10) dead Israeli civilians versus something like 3,000 Palestinians dead). 

Compare also Operation Protective Edge - 3 weeks and 1,800+ Palestinians killed and many thousands wounded + the levelling of homes, infrastructure etc - while the world stood by and kept maintaining in parrot fashion 'Israel has the right to defend itself'.  

Below is a chart of Palestinian and Israeli deaths caused by violence (does not include 8 July 2014 - Operation Protective Edge figures):

Source - IFAMERICANSKNEW - here.  

[Their cited source:  B'Tselem Israel Centre for Human Rights in Occupied Territories]

What was also interesting on the site is the Israeli soldier deaths for 2005:

Causes of Deaths of Israeli Soldiers - 2005

Committed Suicide	30
Illness	14
Accidents	26
Terror Incidents	6

What recently happened to the Israeli boys is deplorable and the retaliatory attack on the Palestinian boy is equally deplorable.

But when I look at the overall statistics (which don't even take into account the 1,800+ recent civilian Palestinian deaths etc, I don't see Israel under any significant threat.

Israel itself refers to quelling Palestinian crude, ineffectual missile lobbing, in periodic resistance, as 'mowing the lawn'.  So it's not exactly a scenario that's proportionate to threat, I would think.

Oddly, Turkey and Qatar are the intermediaries.  But both have close ties to the US.

Fatah has a vested interest, yet it is in a position where it appears to have power over the elected government of Gaza (if I understand correctly).

Forty thousand public servants in Gaza haven't been paid by the Palestinian National Authority, who (pursuant to the Oslo accord) claims 'authority over all the Palestinian areas' -- but, in fact, Hamas has control of Gaza -- minus control of the money:

The PA has received financial assistance from the European Union and the United States (approximately USD 1 bln. combined in 2005). All direct aid was suspended on 7 April 2006 as a result of the Hamas victory in parliamentary elections.  Shortly thereafter, aid payments resumed, but were channeled directly to the offices of Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank.  Conflict between Hamas and Fatah later in 2006 resulted in Hamas taking exclusive control over the administration of all PA institutions in the Gaza Strip. Since 9 January 2009, when Mahmoud Abbas' term as President was supposed to have ended and elections were to have been called, Hamas supporters and many in the Gaza Strip have withdrawn recognition for his Presidency and instead consider Aziz Dweik, who served as the speaker of the house in the Palestinian Legislative Council, to be the acting President until new elections can be held.  No Western financial assistance is given to the PA authorities in Gaza and Western governments do not recognize anyone but Abbas to be the President. [wikipedia]

I'm not clear on whether Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) in the West Bank is supposed to channel some of that money to Gaza or not.  Wikipedia on Abbas is - here - see corruption/embezzlement allegations.

Anyway, this has satisfied my curiosity to a degree regarding Hamas.

It would seem that if Hamas would give in, accept the Oslo accords, disarm and recognise Israel, they would suddenly be legitimised by the US and EU?  But, failing that, they are denied recognition, denied funding, denied diplomatic relations (I gather) and blocked from trade (I gather).

Noticed Russia was among 'the quartet' who insist on the 3 points.

Uncertain what Russia has to do with it, apart from being in the UN, I guess.

I think Russia's friendly with Syria and the Palestinians appear to be opposed to Syria, but I'm not sure why.

Could be that Hamas are Sunni Muslim.  But Syria is about 60% Sunni Muslim.  Although the President (Assad) is not - he is Shia (13% of the Syrian population).  Yes, Shia (Alawite), but described 'secular government'.  Not sure.  This is stuff is out of my league. 

Anyway, it looks like Israel is bent on four things:

1. incapacitate Hamas ability to resist (deplete weapons etc), 
2. maintain blockade,
3. get rid of tunnels (incoming weapons, money etc),
4. maintain territory claimed in wars with Palestinians (I think).

But if you pull away and look at the whole picture (how things are split off, how the cards are stacked against the Palestinians in the form of these various organisations (including the European designation for the region), how they've been kept down economically etc), I think there is so much in this that really disempowers (and is maybe designed to disempower?) the Palestinian people in a big way.

So that's Hamas, I think.

No abuse, please, because I'm on my political L-Plates.  LOL.

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Bit of additional info (got curious re EU):

ISRAEL and ECONOMIC UNION

Israel is an associated state of the European Union. The relations between the two are framed in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the Union for the Mediterranean.

The main legal ties between Israel and the EU are set by the 1995 Association Agreement. Several other agreement cover sectoral issues.

Relations between Israel and the European Union are generally positive on the economic level, though affected by the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the political level.

EU membership for Israel

Although Israel is not in Europe, it considers itself culturally part thereof.  Israel thus is a member in many European transnational federations and frameworks and takes part in many European sporting events. Various Israeli ministers have expressed that they would like to see Israel in the EU. ... The European Union's former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, stated in 2009 that Israel had a very significant relationship with the EU, amounting almost to full cooperation through participation in the EU's programmes. In 2014, former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar said Israel is needed by the European Union, in an address in a room hired by the Henry Jackson Society in the British House of Commons. Aznar said his report recommends that due to its Western culture and the benefits it brings the European Union, Israel should become a full member of the EU without pre-conditions.  Moreover, like most western European countries, Israel is a member of the OECD and from an economic perspective matches the European Union extremely well, with essentially every significant economic indicator (GDP per capita, government deficit, public debt level, current account surplus, inflation level, etc.) closely matching the overall EU average. Israel is however not included among the nine countries that are part of the EU agenda for future enlargement of the European Union. [wikipedia]

Looks like Israel knows how to network. 

Don't get how countries can elect what they 'consider' themselves as, despite their geographic location.  Hey, I might consider myself a Martian, but that doesn't make me an eligible alien from Mars.  LOL

That Spanish dude founded 'Friends of Israel Initiative' - purpose:  to counter attempts to 'de-legitimatise the State of Israel.'  

Check out the Friends of Israel Initiative.  First point:

The Friends of Israel are based on the following principles:

Israel is a modern, flourishing Western country

Oh, get fucked!  It's in the Middle East.  It's not a 'Western country' by any stretch.

This is hilarious.

Slogan:   "Stand for Israel, Stand for the West"

The 'right to self defence' is in there -- and the bogeyman of Iran nuclear weapons and Islam/Jihadists and Israel the saviour of the WESTERN WORLD (of which Israel is a part) ...   LOL.

It's like something out of one of those NGO's that push an agenda, which is probably what it is.  Doh.

Well, I just checked the wiki on Israel and Israel is still located in the Middle East.

Another way of looking at the EU involvement etc, would be as a strategy to further 'legitimise' Israel, by entrenching it in various organisations, institutions etc. 

In my view, the EU is just another way for Israel to pull the strings.

This is what the Palestinians are up against and they haven't a hope.

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POSTSCRIPT

CHECK THIS OUT:

http://consortiumnews.com/2014/08/07/if-a-genocide-falls-in-the-forest/