VIDEO - UKRAINE NAZISM & FASCISM REVIVAL

NAZIS IN UKRAINE https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=zTAFVs17P_8   REVIVAL OF NAZISM & FASCISM IN UKRAINE   https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=uljUTmLaGZ4 NAZIS GLORIFIED IN UKRAINE REBURIAL https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=u7Z0incwC2w ISRAEL LOBBY PROTECTS NEO-NAZIS IN UKRAINE https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=zdSWsSk_Fhc TRANSCRIPTION The Israel Lobby Protects Neo-Nazis in Ukraine An amendment to the 2015 National Defence Authorisation Act that would have forbidden US assistance, training & weapons to neo-Nazis and other extremists in Ukraine was dropped at the request of two of the largest Jewish pressure groups in the United States. Introduced by Democratic Representative John Conyers, the amendment would have explicitly barred those who have offered praise, or glorification, of Nazism, or its collaborators, including through the use of white supremacist, neo-Nazi or other similar symbols, from receiving any form of support from the US Department of Defence. But the amendment was dumped after the Congress faced pressure from the Anti-Defamation League (‘ADL’) and the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, two of the loudest pro-Israel groups in the US. Despite their stated mission to combat anti-Semitism and violent extremism, the ADL and Wiesenthal Centre refused to support Conyer’s proposal on the ground that right-wing Ukrainian parties with documented records of racist extremism had “moderated their rhetoric.” But this is not supported by facts on the ground in Ukraine.  Ukraine’s US supported President, Petro Poroshenko, is leading the nationalists’ dream with a war in the east and Ukraine’s leading party, The People’s Front, is pocked with far-right militants, including Andrei Parubiy, the co-founder of the neo-Nazi inspired Social National Party.  Besides Parubiy, The People’s Front included Andrei Biletsky, leader of the Azov military, an overtly neo-Nazi fighting force that has been on the frontlines of the battle on eastern Ukraine.  Unlike the Svoboda party, the Azov militia does not even feign moderation.  “The historic mission of our nation, in this critical moment, is to lead the white races of the world in a final crusade for their survival,” Biletsky recently wrote.  “A crusade against the Semite-led untermenschen,” an infamous phrase used in Nazi Germany to describe Jews, gypsies and communists. Azov fighters are united in their nostalgia for Nazi Germany and embrace of open fascism.  Sporting Swastika tattoos, the battalion “flies a neo-Nazi symbol resembling a Swastika as its flag,” according to Andrew Kramer of the New York Times. Azov is precisely the sort of neo-Nazi organisation that Conyers’ NDAA amendment would have deprived of US assistance. But when the Congressman sought support from the ADL and the Weisanthal Centre in moving forward, he was rebuked. The amendment died a quiet death and Azov’s American supply line remained intact. ADL’s current posture is in stark contrast to its stance early this year when its outgoing leader, Abraham Foxman noted the Svoboda party’s “history of anti-Semitism and platform of ethnic nationalism” and demanded the party renounce its past glorification of Stepan Bandera a WWII era Nazi collaborator, who has become a symbol of Ukrainian nationalsm. So one minute the ADL is rightfully admonishing the Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups, and the next minute it’s clamouring to give them heavy weaponry? An ADL lobbyist shed light on this paradox by stating: “the focus should be on Russia,” making it clear that the ADL’s position is based on geopolitics; not to fight “anti-Semitism and all forms of bigotry,” as their mission statement claims. ..............................................   How the Israel Lobby Protected Ukrainian Neo-Nazis Max Blumenthal http://www.alternet.org/world/how-israel-lobby-protected-ukrainian-neo-nazis .............................................. NOTE I believe the man in Nazi uniform in the abovementioned video is: Reinhard Gehlen rather than Stepan Bandera. Gehlen was Hitler's eastern front intelligence officer, turned USA / CIA associate, before eventually becoming German intelligence (BND) head.  That's the same intelligence agency that's recently been exposed spying on European politicians and corporations on behalf of the US agency, NSA. The USA has a history of association with Nazis in the aftermath of WWII, and it appears that Zionist organisations have also had a history of collaboration with Nazis - here.

Edward Snowden - PROGRESS 2015 CONFERENCE

TRANSCRIPTION Edward Snowden Via video-link from Russia Moderator: Progress Australia Exec Director,  Nick Moraitis with Paul Barclay on RN Tuesday 19th May AUDIO SOURCE:  here [SKIP] Moderator: ... a federal appeals court in New York ruled on Thursday that the once secret NSA program that is systematically collecting Americans’ phone records in bulk is illegal.  It’s pretty extraordinary.  I guess the question is:  do you feel vindicated? Snowden: It is amazing what this court decisions says, because this is not a court that’s considered particularly partisan in the United States.  This is one that seems very measured, very well respected and it’s probably the most well respected appeals court circuit in the United States, and for them to review a program and say that, despite the fact that it’s been operating for 10 years, it’s been violating our rights for 10 years, is significant.  Particularly, because it was kept secret, the public was not allowed to know and, in fact, in the United States, the most senior intelligence official here, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, lied under oath about the existence of this program and the court completely and categorically rejected that; and, when we look at what the papers actually say about that, it’s particularly significant because, not only did they say that this case – ACLU vs Clapper – completely changed things in terms of was it illegal, this has implications for many other programs, not just this single program that was struck down yesterday, but the entire category of legal reasoning behind  bulk collection behind mass surveillance, so we may see more legal challenges come forward.  But moreso than that, we’ve seen something which is amazing because we’ve got what’s called Amnesty vs Clapper, which in 2013 was almost exactly the same case, but it was dismissed in 2013; they said courts could not hear these programs:  they were too secret, too sensitive and we simply had to trust the government.  Now, after these stories hit the newspaper and after a new case – ACLU vs Clapper – was given a chance to work its way through the legal system we saw something amazing change, which is that judges said we can no longer simply take the government at its word because the government has abused our trust, and that, I think, is something that will last for not just years but hopefully for decades. Moderator: The editorial in today’s New York Times – I don’t have it in front of me, unfortunately, but it makes specific reference to the fact that the key finding here really – or the key concern – is that these programs would never have been made public or this decision would never have been possible without your revelations.  I think we should take a step back, though, for our audience here in Australia and focus a bit on the earlier revelations and just talk our audience through them.  So, we have a slide up on the screen (if we can get it up for you) for our audience here, it’s actually entitled FAA702 OPERATIONS and it lists two types of collection.  It was one of the first slides made available by the media from your leaks.  Would you be able to describe the two types of collections that they’re describing here, the distinction between the two, how they work and we’ll come to what they’re specifically collecting in a moment. Snowden: Okay.  So, I can’t actually see the slide from here, but I believe this is quite a famous slide.  It regards, basically, the PRISM collection program, which is a sort of compelled cooperation between the intelligence services of the Five Eyes countries – the United States, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada – and then we have what’s basically called the Upstream program, which is where they collect this not directly from the companies themselves where they simply say we want everything from this citizen that we want in their data holdings; we want their e-mail; we want the times they logged in, we want the locations they logged in; but we also want to be able to collect that secretly without the knowledge of the companies as it transits across the lines that connect the internet together:  undersea cables, satellite links, fibre back-holes at telecommunications providers – and they are broadly two sections of types of interception.  There’s what’s called metadata collection, which is basically – metadata are the kind of details that a private investigator would collect if they were following around – if the government basically tasked an agent to monitor what you’re doing every day, follow you on foot; they wouldn’t be close enough to hear every word and every conversation you were saying because you would notice them, but they would see who you were meeting with; what, generally, you were discussing; how long you met with them; the places you met with them; where you went afterwards; who you were with; basically, the fact that a communication occurred. The second class is content collection where, for example, they would actually be reading through the body of your e-mails; they would actually be reading the website itself, that you had visited; your entire web history; as well as the contents of the phone calls you had made; they could literally listen to the words you had said to everyone else. Now, in Australia, this is particularly relevant because there’s a metadata retention program that was recently passed under what I believe was called the ASIO Act and this is really dangerous because it has implications - actually, I think the ASIO Act affects more of journalists, but I think there was an additional data act passed, as well -  and the challenges here were not just as the Australian intelligence services had grabbed for more power, the fact that they say:  well, if journalists are publishing things that we consider sensitive programs, intelligence programs, they will be held criminally liable for that, which I’ll point out, in that judgement in the United States just yesterday,  the court said that they could not have reached this judgement without the work of the free press; without the press publishing material which had previously been secret, which was sensitive to intelligence agencies operations but was vital and necessary for the public to know and understand in order to understand the reality of the government’s policies; but the fact that under these mandatory metadata programs that were passed in Australia, you can immediately see, who journalists are contacting from which you can derive who their sources are.  If there’s, for example, a leak that happens in ... the Australian intelligence services, that reveals to the newspapers that the services have been abusing their powers, and the government can simply go into their mass collection of everyone’s communications, regardless of whether they’re suspected of any crime or whether they’re going about their daily business, it’s all there.  They can go, well, which employees from this agency had contacted press organisations and, immediately, they have a list of suspects.  This is dangerous.  This is not things the governments have ever traditionally been empowered to claim for themselves as authorities and, to have that change recently – in the recent past, in the sort of 2013 era – is a radical departure from the traditional operations of liberal societies around the world. Moderator: If we just go back to the PRISM slide for a moment, the most recent one we were showing on screen.  This is the one titled:  ‘PRISM collection Details’; and if you can’t see it, it lists a range of current providers on the left and then on the right, it says “What will you receive in collection?”  Do you want to just talk us through how this PRISM program worked and, in fact, how Australians’ data would be treated here. Snowden: Okay.  This is particularly dangerous for people who are not US citizens relative to other countries in the world.  In the United States if the government or if any of the Five Eyes governments seeks your information under this program, they have to at least go to a judge and get a warrant.  Now, the danger here is that it’s a secret court that in 35 years has been asked to authorise warrants about 35,000 times,  and in those 35 years they’ve only said no twelve times.  Unfortunately, for everyone who is not a United States citizen they don’t require a warrant at all, there’s no involvement of any court, there’s simply a blanket order signed by the Attorney General and basically the national security services, or the spy agencies, can basically submit basically a paper process to these providers and requisition this content through them, outside of the warrant process.  It’s more akin to a subpoena, but the things that it reveals are extraordinary:  everyone you talk to on Skype; all of the messages that you ever sent back and forth; everything that you’ve ever done on your Facebook pages; who you’ve talked to; how long you’ve been on the pages; what you liked; what you didn’t like; these kind of information details.  It’s extraordinarily revealing and for the government to be able to entitle itself to these capabilities particularly in secret, as it happened, without the public’s knowledge, is incredibly empowering for them and incredibly disempowering for civil society. The danger here is the creation of what’s been referred to as ‘turnkey tyranny,’ which is where government claims to follow process and things like that – we can hope for the best – but at any given time, given that these programs operate in secret beyond the reach of public oversight and review, they could change the policies that govern it; they could change the frequency with which they use them, the intrusiveness with which they apply those authorities; and not only would we not know about it, we would have a very limited ability to meaningfully resist that assertion of authority, and that’s dangerous. Moderator: And this is content that’s being hoovered up, essentially, from these providers. Snowden: Correct.  Both content and metadata. Moderator: And does the Australian government also have access to this data on Australian citizens? Snowden: All of the Five Eyes partners can request information through the United States National Security Agency that would come from the PRISM program, for example.  But PRISM is just one of many intelligence programs.  This is one that has struck people deeply because we all recognise the service providers who were on the sly and the fact that they were sharing that information secretly without our knowledge was really upsetting.  But it’s also important to remember that this is not the only program.  It actually goes much deeper than this.  Basically, the reach is far more expansive than and alarming, I think, than just this alone. Moderator: So, a lot of the coverage of your revelations has focused on the NSA, the British Tempora program and so forth.  Can you tell us a bit more about the role of Australia as a partner in the global surveillance regime? Snowden: Right.  So, Australia’s role, in mass surveillance around the world, is similar to the United Kingdom and the Tempora program which you mentioned, which is what’s called a ‘rolling internet buffer’.  Basically, they use local authorities, such as this metadata program that’s been passed in Australia, to collect everyone’s communications in advance of criminal suspicion - this is call ‘pre-criminal investigation’ – and what this means is they’re watching everybody all the time, they’re collecting information and they’re just putting it in pockets that they can search through, not only locally, not only within Australia, but they can then share this with foreign intelligence services such as the United States National Security, the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters, and they can troll through these communications in the same way, and this often happens beyond any sort of court oversight.  The ultimate result there is the fact that regardless or not of whether you’re doing anything wrong, you’re being watched in a new way. Announcer: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER, WHO EXPOSED THE NSA MASS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, VIA VIDEO LINK FROM RUSSIA AT THE PROGRESS 2015 CONFERENCE ON RN OR ONLINE YOU’RE WITH ‘BIG IDEAS’.  LET’S CONTINUE THIS SESSION WITH EDWARD SNOWDEN AND RETURN TO THE MELBOURNE TOWN HALL. Moderator: So governments in Australia, the US, the UK, would say that they need these sort of systems to fight terrorism.  They argue they would be hobbled in their mission without these systems.  I guess, what’s your view on that? Snowden: So, it is important for governments to have the ability to investigate terrorist incidents, to provide for national defence, but the authorities that are typically used in pursuit of those objectives are actually quite different from what we see intelligence agencies arguing for – sort of their supporters, defenders, the apologists class, the legislators, legislatures around the world – when they say:  you know, this will help us stop terrorism.  For example, the court program that was struck down yesterday in the United States as illegal, is based on exactly the same sort of concept as this Australian bulk collection program of metadata.  And what it is, is they ingest all this metadata – who you call, when you call them – so they can create associations of people, and this was sort of argued in parliament as being necessary to prevent terrorist attacks.  Now, unfortunately, for the intelligence agencies in the United States after these programs were revealed, the President himself appointed two independent panels, with comprehensive access to classified information of all of us, with the ability to go into these intelligence services, interview the heads and working officials who use these programs, and say ‘Does this actually stop terrorist attacks?  Has it in the past?  Is it useful?  Is it necessary?’  Basically, the purpose of these reviews was to answer a question:  ‘Do these programs make us safer?’  And, unfortunately, the answer is ‘No’.   And this is not me claiming this; this is the United States government, that has every incentive to basically to let these programs off the hook and say, ‘yes, they’re very valuable,’ ‘yes, we want them to continue.’  In fact, they said, despite the fact that these programs have been operating for more than a decade in some cases, bulk collection of metadata has never prevented a single terrorist attack, nor even made a concrete difference in a single terrorism investigation in the United States.  So the question is not only, ‘Do we want these programs in the context of our values, in the context of liberal societies?’   –  but even if we were willing to sacrifice our rights in that manner – which in the United States is contrary to our constitution to begin with – but, ‘Does it make us safer?’ – and we have classified information that is now public evidence that says, in fact:  no it does not.  Metadata monitoring has never been shown to be useful and it’s never been shown to make us safer.  Moderator: One of the proposals I read about today in New York Times articles is a proposal to switch the storage of the metadata from the NSA to private telecommunications companies and I guess that mirrors in some respects the move here in Australia where the federal government has introduced a mandatory data retention regime where the telecommunications companies themselves have to store the metadata.  Would you prefer the companies to be storing the metadata or the government, if you had a choice? Snowden: So, it’s a little bit ... – the political debate happening about these authorities in the United States is a little bit more complex.  It’s difficult to address in short terms because of the amount of nuance.  But to break it down broadly, there are two possibilities.  There were three. One was that they would reauthorise this sort of intrusive capability without any changes.  That’s dead on arrival now; it’s simply no longer a possibility.  The court has said it’s illegal, it’s politically unwise, no reasonable legislator would try to do that.  There is the second option, which is what you describe, where they amend the program slightly, in that they request information from telecommunications providers rather than having the government intercept it themselves.  There’s not necessarily ... a mandate that requires the telecommunications providers to collect this type of information, in this particular way, because it gets touchy and difficult.  Rather, the general common sense perspective here is that most telecommunications providers have to hold onto some amount of metadata communications activities, some sort of, basically, call detail records for billing purposes.  So now how many SMS messages you’ve sent in a month, how many people you’ve called, how many minutes you use these type of things, the government does not have to force providers to retain that kind of information, they can simply request it through a legal process.  There are questions to be asked there – ‘How should we balance this? How intrusive should we make it?’ – but, generally, that is a lot more reasonable than what’s happened in the past, although still not optimum.  The third option - which is the one which has best the arguments at this point – is simply that they let this authority expire completely and that they go back to using subpoenas and warrants as they always have, because traditional law enforcement authorities here have been shown to work, they’ve been shown to be reliable and they’ve been shown to save lives.  Why are we changing to untested authorities which have been proven not to make us any safer, which require extraordinary amounts of investment – I believe, in the case of Australia, the new bill mandating metadata retention has been estimated to cost at least $400-million annually.  Should we really be doing this at all?  And that’s the question we should be asking. Moderator: I guess also, with the Sony and the liability of our telecommunications companies in Australia, I’m not sure I would be trusting them with my data.  Snowden: And there is a real question of once you start gathering this data.  From an attacker’s perspective – at one point I did, basically, computer network attack analysis for the National Security Agency, which meant I was trying to see what malicious hackers and so on and so forth were doing around the internet – and wherever this data is gathered, where it’s centralised, it’s exactly as you say, it becomes a target, a vector for attack and, ultimately, these things are very difficult to defend against capable actors but, also, you know, the sixteen year old in their basement.  Simply, attack is easier than defence nowadays and if you gather sensitive information, it will be misused or control of it will be lost. Moderator: So, Ed, as far as I gather, only a small percentage of the files you’ve leaked have actually been reported on.  Why is this, I guess, and do you expect there to be more revelations, including about Australia? Snowden: So, the reasoning behind this is I, as an individual, as a citizen working on behalf the government, I didn’t want to make a decision unilaterally about what should and should not be published in the case of classified information, because there’s a chance that based on my own political biases, which are quite clear, I would like to think, I could basically err too heavily on the side of disclosure, perhaps improperly, perhaps I could misunderstand some of the implications of a particular detail, even though I worked for the secret services for about 8 years and understand them quite well, so the question for me was how do I basically try to mitigate the risk of making a personal mistake if I were publishing this myself and, so what I believed was the best way to do this was to partner with institutions of the free press – you know, institutions that everybody trusts, everybody understands are working to basically hold the government to account of both the law and the public – and allow them to make the decisions about what should and should not be public, and then I would require them as a basis of receiving materials, or unlisted [?] material here, to ask the government in advance of publication to review it just to ensure that no particular detail – you know, the name of an individual officer, the name of a site which may not be fully understood, if the implications are revealed that would not be fully understood – to certify, basically, that this errrr—these stories are not going to risk life or harm—the threat of harm to any particularised individual; and in every case that’s been the process that’s been followed, the result of which is the fact that now we’re in 2015 and while in 2013 government officials are saying the sky is falling, this is going to enable terrorists, there’s going to be blood on the hands of press institutions that are publishing this material, in fact that hasn’t come to pass in even a single case.  National Security officials have been repeatedly questioned about this, under oath in front of Congress and never in a single case have they shown anyone who has come to harm or even harm that has resulted to collection capabilities and so forth as a result of this material becoming public, and on that basis, I think it’s pretty fair to say that publication will continue and the purpose of the free press in society is to do exactly this kind of thing; to champion the public interest, to act as an adversary against the government on the behalf of the public, and to really hold the most powerful officials in our society to the account of the law, which traditionally is quite difficult to do when operations have kind of been in secrecy. Moderator: And about Australia, do you think there will be more about Australia? Snowden: I think that’s fair to say. Announcer: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE FORMER NSA CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEAKING OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS THAT EXPOSED THE MASS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM UNDERTAKEN BY US AGENCIES ... [skip] ... JOINING EDWARD SNOWDEN ON THE PANEL ARE GREENS SENATOR SCOTT LUDLAM AND THE AUSTRALIAN DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ELAINE PEARSON. Moderator: How does this sort of surveillance regime and the other Australian national security legislation that Ed alluded to affect our human rights? Elaine Pearson: (HRW Australia) Clearly, fundamentally, this is about the right to privacy.  But the right to privacy is really—you know, it has knock-on effects for every one of our civil liberties:  freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association.  If the government is intercepting and monitoring, you know, what we say and who we’re talking to, this is going to have a chilling effect in terms of how we communicate with people, where we go and, you know, how we meet up with people.  And, you know, this is a particular concern to human rights activists because the work that we do is really about exposing the behaviour that governments are often seeking to cover up or to hide, and my organisation has done quite a bit of work on this in the United States.  We’ve looked at the harmful impact of mass surveillance on journalists and on lawyers.  Lawyers have told us they, basically, how they’ve had to resort to the tactics of drug dealers simply to get the job done:  you know, using ‘burner phones’, ensuring that they have face-to-face meetings, these sorts of things; and, you know, this is really worrying and it’s particularly worrying in Australia where, as Ed mentioned, we have this new ASIO act which was rammed through parliament with very little discussion and journalists and human rights activists and whistleblowers now face five to ten years in prison simply for making certain types of unauthorised disclosures, even if they’re in the public interest and I think ...there are certainly some editors and some journalists who are going to sort of not report on certain things, particularly in Australia where issues of asylum seekers, immigration we’ve been talking about today, are seen as a national security issue.  We don’t want to see a sort of legitimate public debate of these issues covered up because people are scared about being thrown in prison.  Moderator: Thanks, Elaine.  Scott, Ed described the role of Australia in the Five Eyes agreement.  What’s your view on Australia’s participation in this cooperative spying regime? Scott Ludlam: (Australian Greens) Well, I think it needs to be subject to comprehensive public review and thanks to Progress for getting Ed on-board and thank you Ed for being here – obviously for beaming in so we can hear from you directly, but also in a way for enabling the conversation to occur at all.  So, I guess on behalf of all of us, thank you for what you’ve done. Scott Ludlam: (Australian Greens) And in terms of Australia’s participation in the Five Eyes, I guess one of the things that’s been so valuable about these revelations and the way they’ve been reported is that at least we now know a little bit.  So the Australian agency, the Australian Signals Directory – the ASD – is one of the partner organisations of the Five Eyes and operates with the absolute bare minimum of scrutiny and I feel like we know probably less about its operations even than we do about the US NSA now or some of the partner organisations because the debate here in Australia is so stifled, we don’t have a benchmark and a bill of rights to kind of test some of these concepts against in court, and we have a really flattened political debate, you know, unlike even in the United States where it’s ferocious and fierce and very polarised, but here in Australia we’re told, you know, these people are traitors, they’re a national security threat, just trust the government everything’s going to be fine.  I think the Five Eyes agreement needs to be comprehensively reviewed by the light of day and we can’t do it without this kind of information in the public domain. Moderator: Thank you.  Ed, do you have any quick response to that? Snowden: I do, actually.  I would say that he pointed out a really critical *** basically in the management of intelligence services.  It’s not that anyone aims, working in an intelligence services organisation is—errr, you know, they’re intentionally being ***; none of these are bad guys; they’re all trying to—errr, they see themselves as—the culture of these places is that they’re good people doing bad things for good reasons:  they want to help, they want to keep us safe.  But the problem is when you reach that sort of utilitarian culture, sort of an authoritarian tint, over the operations of how you go about your business, simply saying that the ends justifies the means, and you don’t have the public involved in the oversight and the review of that, you don’t have the full body of legislature who’s able to challenge the operations of the executive branch of government, you run an almost certain risk that these services will go to far.  And we’ve seen this not just in the United States, we’ve seen this in cooperating agencies, Five Eye services around the world.  For example, in the United Kingdom they found that the intelligence sharing between UK and the US had been unlawful.  It had violated the rights of people for more than seven years.  We saw when these programs were happening in secret nobody really contested them, but when it became public, when we saw basically international law reviews, when we saw domestic law reviews, they were found to violate people’s rights on a massive comprehensive scale again and again, in country after country, and government officials, they pushed back.  They said, look, this is just metadata in some cases, because they didn’t want to talk about the content cases.  They felt that metadata was an easier win, but having worked at the NSA, I can tell you that metadata is much more valuable than content.  As someone looking at computer tech and computer communications, basically looking at your signature web track, looking at everything you do online, what you’re doing on your smart phone and so on and so forth, I would much rather troll through your metadata of your communications than the content of it, because metadata is much easier to search on machine based terms, it’s much easier to analyse algorithmically and metadata doesn’t lie.  People lie when they’re engaged in actual wrongdoing.  You know, you may tell the truth to your grandmother when you’re discussing a cookie recipe and things like that.  But when we’re talking about bad people planning bad things, they talk around it, they use code-words, they’re deceptive.  But the impact of metadata, the sensitivity of metadata, simply cannot be overstated.  They’re collecting information about everyone in every place regardless of whether or not they’ve done anything wrong, which the US Director of National Security Agency – the previous one, Michael Hayden – said:  “We use metadata to kill people.”  His general counsel, the top lawyer for the agency, said that metadata is a proxy for content.  When you have enough metadata, you don’t need content at all.  So the government’s tried to split hairs and say, you know, metadata’s not that big a deal.  You should be very sceptical about that.  And beyond that, when we talk about why they’re so concerned about the public knowing about just the bare outlines of what they’re doing because, again, what’s been published had not been granule details.  We’re not talking about the names of human agents operating behind enemy lines or anything like that, that would pose any sort of risk to life of any individual.  We’re talking about systems.  We’re talking about legal authorities.  We’re talking about the government’s secret interpretations of the law.  And when we look at this kind of thing we have seen time and time again and within classified governments within the halls of government where they said, you know they’re not actually afraid that anyone in government is going to come to harm from these programs that any public representative is going to incur a greater risk, that we’re going to be hit by attackers that we won’t be able to stop.  What they actually said – this is in the United Kingdom – they said in a top secret document amongst its lawyers, what they were really afraid of was a damaging public debate.  What they were afraid of was not that terrorists would know about this but that its citizens would know about this.  That we might begin to mount legal challenges that we might try to have a voice in the policy in a way that they simply did not want to, and that is something that I think we really need to create structures within our institutions to prevent.  It’s not about bad intentions; it’s about bad structure. It’s the fact that when you create systems that watch everyone, everywhere, all the time; when you collect it all, as the NSA motto is, you understand nothing.  And we’ve seen this time and time again.  The fact that we’re monitoring everyone’s phone calls in the United States did not stop the Boston marathon bombings.  The fact that the attackers in Charlie Hebdo in France were known to the intelligence services prior to the attack did not stop it.  The same case in Canada.  The same case in Australia.  Nine times out of ten when you see someone on the news who’s engaged in some sort of radical jihadist activity, these are people who had a long record and the reason these attacks happen is not because we didn’t have enough surveillance;  in fact, it’s because we had too much.  We didn’t prioritise the cases we had because we had wasted too many resources on watching everybody who didn’t present a threat that we couldn’t allocate the manpower, the man hours, the actual dollar resources, to watching the people who actually did represent a specific imminent threat. Moderator: And I guess the countries we’re speaking about Australia, the UK, the US, countries which we consider democracies, which have strong protections in general – for example, the US Constitution – and we’re talking about technologies that are actually, I guess, you know, at the early stages of their development.  Are you concerned—I guess my concern, really, I’m interested in your views on this, where this is going in terms of other countries and the future developments of technology as we move forward. Snowden: Yeah.  Thank you for asking because this is really important.  You know, people think about this as sort of science-fiction-like.  Only the National Security Agency can do this, only the spies in Western advanced countries have these capabilities, can achieve these capabilities and that’s categorically ***.   I mean, China has led the world for a very long time in monitoring the internet communications:  the way we firewall it, the way we censor it, the way we block it.  Russia, very little has been reported on it, but one has to assume they have very much the same capabilities; they have a program called SORM, which is assumed to be very much the same.  And we see this happening in country after country.  The problem is that even if we pass the best laws in the world in the West – you know, even if we have comprehensive reform in liberal societies, the Australian parliament says we reject mass surveillance comprehensively; metadata retention; we’re striking it down; encryption backdoors, we will never engage in that; we’re going to ensure anyone that engages with an Australian company, that buys an Australian product or service, or engages in Australian civil society, their rights and their privacy will be protected; as soon as your communications cross your borders that’s going to change – that’s no longer going to be enforceable because every other country in the world would have to have the same laws.  We have to have basically governments work in partnership with industry with academia, and civil society to basically push forward research and activism efforts to ensure that we can enforce our rights; not just through our law, but through our technology, that we demand strong, robust, reliant encryption.  That means when an Australian communicates with a web service, with a provider, with a friend through their phone, or anything like that, they know that the only person who will be able to read that communication is the intended recipient at the other end of that communication and that the government will basically work to champion and uphold that social contract, rather than undermine it.  We don’t want to move toward a world where basically we’re choosing between surveillance and security, and that’s very much the case today.  They stand on opposite ends of basically incentives and policy.  In order for governments to be able to monitor us, they have to weaken the security of the communications that we all rely upon everywhere, whether it’s through your bank, whether it’s through your private lives, your private records.  And when they do this, they don’t only make it easy for themselves to monitor the communications, they make it possible for every authoritarian, illiberal regime to do exactly the same thing. TRANSCRIPTION STOPPED AT – 38:20 of 53:58 total audio. Asterisks used to mark spaces where audio unclear to me. Question marks used to mark best guess at preceding word.   [  Q & A  Follows  ] COMMENT Thought I'd have a shot at transcribing the ABC Snowden audio for something educational to do, as the interview sounded quite interesting (and as it takes quite a bit for me to fully absorb information).  Not sure that hanging on every word is necessarily going to make me any wiser, but, I live in hope I'll remember more of this than I otherwise would. The above is just a best shot at getting the audio down and I'd say it's pretty close but not necessarily 100%, plus there's words that were unclear to me.  Also, I have not given this a final once-over to weed out any minor errors, so be warned. The portion about intelligence officers not seeing themselves as the bad guys and being people whose intentions are good was difficult to understand in two respects.  Firstly, the flow of Snowden's speech/ideas seemed a bit disjointed to me, so it was hard to get it down properly (but I'm hoping I've managed get it straight).  Secondly, intelligence services personnel may well see themselves as 'good guys' and they may well have a role in keeping nations safe.  But that isn't the full extent of what intelligence services are party to, and they have a record of being party to what is unlawful and undemocratic.  Just in terms of mass surveillance, we know governments and their intelligence agencies have broken laws and violated the rights of citizens of entire nations, as well as spying on their own allies, on various private companies, on members of the 'free' press and on lawyers (never mind legal privilege) - and they're parties to spying on and infiltrating activists exercising their political and democratic rights. And that's just the tame end of business.  Intelligence agencies are parties to: *assassination of elected leaders *coups *military invasions *support of dictator governments *carpet bombing *atomic bombing *wars for profit Oh, and there's also the rendition, torture, CIA black sites, the groovy kill list database, weekly kill list, drone bombings, hacking, blackmail, entrapment, false flag ops, arms dealing, assassinations, commercial spying, leaks, cover-ups, infiltration of the 'free' press, farming out intelligence to private contractors (who are even more 'above' the law than the the government agencies, in the sense that they're off the radar and there's not much hope of getting transparency from private companies - much like those private 'security services', ie mercenaries). These are just some of the things that come to mind.  Seeking to undermine and dominate nations around the world isn't about 'national security'; it's about commercial gains.  To change the course of a nation's history for nothing more than corporate greed is evil, I think. Mass surveillance isn't about 'good' intentions, 'help' or 'safety'; it's striving for totalitarian control of the domestic underclass and for control on global level in order to enhance existing power, in order to maintain control and, most probably, to also thwart any possibility of the ruling elites ever being challenged by the underclasses that are perhaps perceived by such elites as bound to eventually wake up to the great con job that's been perpetrated by those in power. The great con job is the notion of a benign, 'liberal' Western society, democracy and the benign 'free' press that's a pillar of this holy grail of 'democracy', supposedly giving the masses truth and transparency, and keeping those at the top accountable.  But the reality is something entirely different.  The 'free' press is the corporate press and corporate media, which is concentrated; it's controlled by corporate giants; and even when it's not in the hands of giants, that same mainstream press is part of part of the establishment that rules and in the service of that ruling establishment, churning out propaganda, lies, social engineering sermons and garbage.  The press is known to be obliging to government (think Op Mockingbird, think obliging journalists, think obliging editors, think obliging moguls etc - oh and let's not forget run of the mill chummy journalist-government relationships that evolve, eg in war reporting etc etc).  But even if this were not so, there's always government suppression notices and now gag orders, the threat of secret investigation, threat of prison sentences for publishing what the government does not want published - when the mere threat of job loss isn't enough. So we have this 'free' press that's owned and controlled by the establishment and in bed with the government.  Individual US journalists have stated that they haven't published because they're 'patriotic'.  So in addition to the omnipresent 'national security' cover all big stick, there's 'patriotism', the chummy personal relationships re government sources and the resulting willingness to please, the question of access to government sources (which can be withheld sneakily (see Obama cutting out those that aren't subservient to the White House)).  That's all I can think of for the moment, but there's probably a few more factors that keep journalists in line.  But the most effective silencer would most likely be having to produce what the editor expects you to produce - writing to order.  The mainstream press and the mainstream media circus (TV, radio) set the news agenda for consumption by the majority, so those cool, off-beat news sources that challenge what the masses are being fed might be a part of the 'free' press column that's supposed to serve as a challenge to those in power, but it isn't much of a challenge when the truth is drowned out by the garbage that's churned out for consumption by a majority that will look no further. Bearing in mind this corporate 'free' press/media scenario in the West, we have an intelligence whistleblower that, as I understand, has granted select members of such press access to intelligence material the subject of potential publication on the proviso that such material be vetted by the government ... after  the 'unbiased' bedfellows of the government determine what is worthy of public attention. While such intentions (along with editing specifics such as names and places) may sound noble, the scenario sounds either extraordinarily naive or part of a psyop to me.  I don't believe for one moment that having given over control of information to (a) the obedient press and (b) the government, that the such government will permit release of anything damaging to itself.   And without a repository of information accessible to all, there's no telling how much or what has been withheld. That's just my general feeling about mainstream press and government vetted whistleblower information. The contradiction between metadata is everything and metadata overload is useless is a bit perplexing for me: (1)   Metadata is *everything*  - easy analysis  /  relied on for kill lists. (2)   ‘When you collect everything, you understand nothing.’ If metadata is such a useful tool because it's easily searched, relationships can be mapped and so on, why would intelligence agencies wish to give up that tool?  Yes, overload conceivably means not prioritising and missing out on prioritising targets, but mass surveillance is the ultimate control tool to keep the underclass in check, to gain commercial advantage, to gain political advantage, to ruin one's rivals and so on - the possibilities are endless.  Playing with mass surveillance must be the closest thing to being god.  An omnipresent, infinite, all controlling digital god unstoppable intelligence apparatus (lol, maybe I'm getting carried away here, but that's how I picture it).  So why would those that sit at the top relinquish that kind of power over mere slaves? That leaves technology.  But what are the chances of the masses having access to privacy technology minus backdoors or exploits that render such technology pointless?  I don't really trust any encryption tool and especially not anything the government friendly tech corporations have happening.  Aiming to have a seat at the table of 'democracy' when the likes of Koch brothers own what is held out as 'democracy' is rather idealistic and, that being so, doesn't that render the fundamental values that one hopes to stand for as fanciful as notions of American democracy? The technology for warzones that trickles down to be used on an unsuspecting public and then by law enforcement is super creepy and it definitely seems worthwhile resisting before the technology becomes institutionalised, but I can't see how the public can resist anything they're subjected to when the public has no real say in government or lawmaking (look at the laws that get pushed through, look how government operates, look at the secret TPP, look at laws disregarded by government, look at mass surveillance, look at surveillance and infiltration of activists, look at deposed prime ministers who have tried to stand up to intelligence services and USA etc etc).

Foreign Service Updates

More on Uruguay Protest Ex-Gitmo Detainees In Uruguay Protest At US Embassy - inadequate deal in exchange asylum https://knpr.org/npr/2015-04/ex-gitmo-detainees-uruguay-protest-us-embassy Uruguay Protest USA 5 out of 6 ex-Guantanamo Bay inmates relocated to Uruguay have camped outside of US embassy After 15-years of abuse in military prison / seek compensation. USG says:  no obligation /detained under law of war http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Ex-Guantanamo-Inmates-Continue-Protest-at-Uruguays-US-Embassy-20150502-0016.html Biden Declares War on Iran VP Joe Biden: US will go to war to keep Iran from going nuclear "... said that President Barack Obama had authorized military preparations in the event of a decision to strike Iran." “No such policy existed before president Obama uttered it, that all instruments of American power to prevent — not contain — a nuclear armed Iran would be used ,” Biden said. “He made sure that our military had the capacity and the ability to execute the mission if required.” http://www.jta.org/2015/04/30/news-opinion/united-states/auto-draft-87 Iran - Re Seized Danish Ship - Maersk Tigris cargo ship, Maersk Tigris - seizure re commercial dispute / ship will be released after settlement of debts http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/04/30/408877/Iran-Maersk-carg-vessel-denmark-US Maersk Tigris - appeal court has ruled Maersk Line to pay $3.6 million http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-navy-starts-to-accompany-us-ships-passing-through-strait-of-hormuz-759666 USA - Strait of Hormuz US Navy ships started accompanying US-flagged commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz on Thu http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-navy-starts-to-accompany-us-ships-passing-through-strait-of-hormuz-759666 Philippines US poured $20-m into Philippines’ National Coast Watch Centre, Manila 24-hr maritime info ops ties together over dozen stations + sensors, & ships of Coast Guard comprehensive monitoring vessels near Philippine waters Philipinnes Objection filed w UN tribunal Hague / reclamation projects by China in disputed territories South China Sea Philippines filed challenge: under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea {PHL seek US support re reclamation} http://globalnation.inquirer.net/122188/us-pours-20m-into-ph-coast-watch-center/ Saudi Arabia intends to increase number of SA doctors receiving US training initiative to make SA attractive location for medical tourism [Sounds like there's money to be made in Saudi Arabia healtcare] http://www.arabnews.com/news/740341 Jean Chrétien - Russia Former PM of Canada visited Putin Moscow Thu. slap to the govt of PM Stephen Harper Def Min Jason Kenney no brief /mysask US Sec State John Kerry currently SriLanka Then off to:  Nairobi  Kenya   Sri Lanka Secretary of State John Kerry arrives.  Scheduled to lay foundation for the new US Embassy in Colombo  1st Sec State visit in decade former govt of Mahinda Rajapaksa was tilted towards China x3 UN resolutions against SL http://www.colombopage.com/archive_15A/May02_1430541070CH.php Africa Burundi x3 killed grenade attacks on police 600 arrested Pres election:  June 26 Social Media etc lockdown http://www.globalpost.com/article/6535439/2015/05/01/burundi-says-600-arrested-over-protests-three-killed-attacks Burundi landlocked, S-E Africa Twa, Hutu + Tutsi Germany colony ceded to Belgium post WWI civil war mid. 20thC - independence 1966 Christian population at 80–90%, with Roman Catholics representing largest group at 60–65% "Burundi population growth rate is 2.5 percent per year, more than double the average global pace, and a Burundian woman has on average 6.3 children, nearly triple the international fertility rate." "Subsistence agriculture accounts for 90% of agriculture." Lowest GDP per capita in the world. Densely populated. Hungriest country in world in terms of percentage /wikipedia 1972 mass killings of Hutus by Tutsi-dominated army 1993 mass killings of Tutsis by the Hutu majority *Looks like biggest issue may be ethnic Pierre Nkurunziza President of Burundi since 2005 attempt to stand 3rd consecutive term, a problem dissident crackdown http://www.globalpost.com/article/6535439/2015/05/01/burundi-says-600-arrested-over-protests-three-killed-attacks Burundi 2014 - Nkurunziza banned jogging, due to "fears it was being used as a cover for subversion." Nkurunziza's allies say his first term does not count as he was appointed by parliament & not directly by the ppl /wikipedia Libya / Qorvis (MLS Group) Libya embassy in WA cancels $1 million PR contract w  Qorvis (MLS Group) b/c also signed  Qatar’s Al-Jazeera Libya - this is the Western backed govt Media say Qatar accused of supporting  GNC/Libya Dawn / Tripoli Libya Embassy "used to have two PR companies in [Washington] DC, which is often very essential for embassies to do in DC”. http://www.libyaherald.com/2015/05/02/libyan-embassy-in-washington-cancels-us-1-million-pr-contract/ Qorvis WA PR firm 2014  Publicis Groupe {a French multinational} Saudi Arabia hired Qorvis to improve its image post 9-11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qorvis market & consumer research, media training & grassroots lobbying service "Qorvis criticized by human rights groups for representing rogue govts such as Bahrain." [Wikipedia] Pakistan Senior diplomats accused of sending convicted prisoners from Bangkok to Pakistan refused to meet Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Pakistan - persons convicted of serious crimes brought back to Pak & freed. *Also fake Pak ID http://tribune.com.pk/story/879506/prisoner-extradition-inquiry-diplomats-refuse-to-cooperate-with-fia/ [ Had trouble understanding this article.  Pakistan's doing prisoner swaps & then freeing the exchangees? ] AUSTRALIA $US1.5 trillion ($1.9 trillion) Texas economy is virtually same size as Australia's & slightly larger population of 27 million ppl Texas = home to 52 Fortune 500 companies Austrade opens consulate general office in Houston Houston = Au. 7th diplomatic & trade post in US > embassy in WA > consulate in: *New York *Chicago *San Francisco *LA *Hawaii http://www.afr.com/news/economy/austrade-opens-consulate-general-office-in-houston-despite-oil-plunge-20150503-1mycty [ So, Texas is huge and the US is even bigger.  lol ] AUSTRALIA USG grant upgrade x Southern Cross cable network fiber optic link Oz NZ Hawaii LA Oz Hawaii Seattle http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/news/2015/04/30/university-of-hawaii-to-strengthen-pacific.html Afghanistan - Qatar delegation from Afghanistan is headed to Qatar to hold 2 days talks with Taliban reps Since w/drawal US & NATO forces, Afghan security forces casualties have spiked. Prior dialogue attempt collapsed. "reconciliation" talks / not peace negotiations *nobody repping govt or parties / individual capacity attendance only http://www.menafn.com/1094201245/Afghanistan-Taliban-to-hold-two-days-of-talks North Korea is holding x4 South Korea nationals x2 arrested March said in interviews w CNN that they spied for South Korea's intel agency http://www.globalpost.com/article/6536760/2015/05/03/two-men-arrested-north-korea-say-they-spied-south-cnn ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ COMMENT:  THOUGHT THIS STUFF WAS INTERESTING AT THE TIME ... NOT NECESSARILY INTERESTING TO ANYONE ELSE.  LOL. IF THE TEXAS ECONOMY AND POPULATION IS VIRTUALLY THE SIZE OF AUSTRALIA'S, HOW TINY IS AUSTRALIA COMPARED TO THE US?

Sweden - Diakonia - Bo Forsberg

SWEDEN GOOGLE TRANSLATION Diakonia Bo Forsberg has most publications With 32 published opinion articles in the years 2001-2011 has Diakonia's Secretary General Bo Forsberg most successful of all religious företrädare.- I'm not so surprised, he says to Date. by John Ottestig October 23, 2013 Marta Axners thesis shows that relatively few religious leaders (30 people) produced just over 42 percent of the published debate articles from 2001 to 2011. The list is topped by Bo Forsberg, with 32 publications, followed by Sten-Gunnar Hedin and Peter Weiderud with 24 published articles each. According to Bo Forsberg is long-term work that has borne fruit: - We are working with international aid, and we know that political decisions on issues relating, for example, trade, aid and debt relief have huge importance if we want to change the world. 5-6 years ago we took a strategic decision. It meant that we have built a broad expertise and today we have a whole team of press officers and senior people who have relationships with politicians and others in power. Marta Axner mean that it has become easier for religious leaders to gain space on the discussion pages. But Bo Forsberg says it does not recognize the problem: - Generally, I would say that it is easier today. It probably depends primarily on Diakonia, the organization has built up a trust for a long time. I find it hard to make the connection to the new thesis, but I also think the radio and television, I would say that we have much greater impact today. Marta Axner argue that religious actors adapts to debate the sides. What do you say about that? - I can admit that we formulate ourselves in a certain way in the media. But I argue very firmly that we will not compromise on the message, it's only about a linguistic processing of the text to be comprehensible even to those who are not daily basis dealing with development issues. Are you surprised that you have, for example, the Swedish Church Archbishop for you on the list of the persons who have received the most debated articles published? - No, I actually do not, as I said, this is part of our work. We have developed a set of values ??and based on it we have decided that we should be in the public debate. http://www.dagen.se/diakonias-bo-forsberg-har-flest-publiceringar-1.104277 OTHER Zambia Memo of Understanding signed w Sweden mining + corporate social responsibility (CSR) church participation encouraged / Hallelujah! FAITH-BASED Swedish development org, Diakonia, representative urging ppl to question application of taxes  https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=28309 Diakonia f. 1966 interl devel org / network ppl, orgs & churches does not carry out any projects of its own / supports local 2009 - Diakonia 400 partner orgs in about 30 countries Secretary General = Bo Forsberg [sources - various] Marta Axners thesis (referred to above) =  few religious leaders (30 ppl) pump out abt 42% published debate articles  2001-2011 Bo Forsberg = top [dagen.se] Oct. 2008 Joakim Wohlfeil said at meeting Gothenburg Diakonia is more a lobby group with political agenda for Middle East [philosemitism] Pro Israel blog [2008] complains Diakonia ME agenda bias w/out accompanying solution to terrorism in region  [philosemitism] COMMENT Not a great translation.   So, very few religious leaders drive what is supposed to be 'public debate' regarding what must be aspects of Swedish foreign (and other) policy and, according to the thesis, the head of Diakonia (a religious quarter lobby group that seeks to influence policy in the Middle East) is foremost in terms of output among this small religious, public debate chorus set. Found this interesting.